DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING **EXAMINATIONS 2005**

MSc and EEE/ISE PART IV: MEng and ACGI

Corrected Copy

NETWORK SECURITY

Tuesday, 10 May 10:00 am

Time allowed: 3:00 hours

There are SIX questions on this paper.

Answer FOUR questions.

All questions carry equal marks

Any special instructions for invigilators and information for candidates are on page 1.

Examiners responsible

First Marker(s):

P.J. Beevor

Second Marker(s): E. Gelenbe

	Special	instructions	for	invigilators:	None
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Information for candidates: None

- Explain how the RSA algorithm may be used to create digital signatures Explain why RSA digital signatures are normally used to sign a Message Digest instead of the message itself. What advantages does a digital signature created by a public cryptographic system have over a MAC created by a secret key algorithm and a shared secret?

 [5]
 - (b) What are the advantages of using a public key exponent of 3 in the generation and verification of RSA digital signatures? In what circumstances would it be impossible to use 3 as an RSA public key exponent?

 [3]
 - (c) In a simple demonstration of the concept of RSA digital signatures, it was decided to use either the pair of small primes 23 and 29 or 19 and 23 as p and q where the public key modulus is $n = p \times q$. Show that if a public key exponent of 3 is to be used in the demonstration, then 23 and 29 must be used for the p and q.
 - (d) In the case where p and q are 23 and 29, and the public key exponent is 3, find the private key. In this demonstration system what would be the maximum length of message digest (in bits) that could be given a unique RSA signature?
 [7]
 - (e) In the demonstration system described above a single octet message digest of 01100100 is signed with a single octet signature of 11010001. Verify the signature.

[5]

2 (a) What is meant by a weak key in DES? Explain the possible result of choosing a weak key.

If keys are chosen at random, what is the probability of choosing a weak key?

[5]

(b) Explain how the strength of DES can be increased by the use of triple encryption. What is the effective key length of triple DES? Discuss whether a double encryption with two independently chosen 56-bit keys could be used to provide the same effective key length.

[7]

(c) Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the even and odd rounds of IDEA. Show that the even round is its own inverse.

[5]

(d) If the first two 16-bit inputs in the odd round (i.e. X_a and X_b) are 0AC4 and F20E respectively, and the keys K_a and K_b are 1C25 and 0D2A respectively, find the associated two 16-bit outputs.

[8]




Figure 2.1 IDEA Odd Round




Figure 2.2 IDEA Even Round

(a) What are the properties of a good Message Digest function? If it were possible to find two messages which produced the same Message Digest function, explain how it might be possible to compromise a communication system which relied on that Message Digest function as part of its authentication process. In what circumstances would a Message Digest function be vulnerable to an attacker being able to find a pair of messages with identical message digests?

[6]

(b) Describe how the cipher block chaining (CBC) and the counter mode methods may be used to encrypt a stream of plaintext using a block cipher. In each case explain how decryption is performed. In what circumstances would the counter mode be preferred to CBC?

[6]

- (c) What is the purpose of the initialisation vector used in CBC when the plaintext represents the following?
 - (i) a monthly salary statement for a company's employees;
 - (ii) an email message for which an individual message key is to be randomly chosen;
 - (iii) a standard message which is to be authenticated by a MAC created as a CBC residue.

[6]

(d) A mutual authentication system designed for a client/server relationship works in the following way. The client initiates the transaction by announcing its identity and by sending a random number as a challenge to the server. The server responds by forming a cryptographic hash of the challenge using a secret key it shares with the client. The server includes its own challenge to the client using a new randomly chosen number. The client checks the hash received and creates its own hash of the challenge using the shared secret and sends this back for the server to check. If both hashes are correct, mutual authentication has been achieved.

Analyse this authentication protocol and suggest a method by which it could be attacked.

[7]

(a) With reference to the OSI Reference Model, explain how security can be implemented at layers 1, 2 and 7. Give examples of systems for which security at these layers would be appropriate. [6] (b) Figure 4.1 is an illustration of the initial handshake protocol for SSL. Explain the purpose of each line of the protocol. Explain if and how each party is authenticated. Give an example of a system for which SSL would be an appropriate security tool. [7] (c) In the context of the IPSec protocol explain the terms tunnel and transport mode Discuss which mode would be appropriate for the following: (i) firewall to firewall communication; (ii) IP Virtual Private Networks. [6] (d) Describe two ways in which the property of delegation of rights can be implemented in Kerberos V.5. Describe a possible practical application for each technique mentioned. [6]

SSL PROTOCOL




Figure 4.1

4

- 5 (a) Describe how firewalls can be configured for the following purposes:
 - (i) to prevent remote login from a source external to the firewall;

[4]

(ii) to bar all TCP sessions initiated from outside the firewall.

[4]

(b) Discuss the limitations of firewalls to provide total security.

[5]

(c) The following describes a plan to provide a new internet banking service. If you were asked to conduct a security audit of the proposed operation (both the development and the operational phase) describe your approach to the task. In your discussion highlight any areas which could give rise to serious vulnerabilities

To ensure a rapid and professional development the bank has outsourced the development of its Internet banking service to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). No changes are to be made to the bank's systems for maintaining accounts, and the ISP has been asked to build a system which interfaces with the existing banking system. To assist development the ISP's software development centre has been provided with a branch banking terminal with the same facilities available to all other operational offices of the bank. This terminal is connected into the bank's live system through an Internet connection.

It is intended that, when the system is ready to go live, a section of the ISP's help desk will be responsible for registering existing bank customers onto the new internet banking service. In this connection, the ISP has been given a target to enable a customer to go live within 30 minutes of making a call to the help desk. To meet this target the ISP will ask the caller for the account name and account number/sort code, and will then effect a connection and provide the new internet customer with a login and password. At this point the new customer will have full facilities to view details on his account and to initiate new transactions.

[12].

(a) In a public key infrastructure explain what is meant by the following: 6. (i) A chain of certificates, (ii) A Certificate Revocation List, (iii) A trust anchor. [6] Given that the electronic mail systems PEM and PGP both use standard algorithms for authentication and encryption, explain how PEM can be considered more secure than PGP. [5] (c) What is meant by non-repudiation in the context of electronic mail security? Explain how it may be implemented with a public key system and with a secret key system [6] (d) Two parties wish to communicate by email from time to time and intend to keep the content of their communications, and the fact that communications are taking place, a total secret. Describe how they might achieve their aim. [4] (e) A principal wishes to send an encrypted mail to 100 recipients whose public keys are known to him. Describe an efficient way to achieve this. [4]

E444/3021/It 4.451 Network Security 05 Amours. (a) Let un be menage or menage digert " of be search they exponent e, u he public han prin (egstræt, modelen, then signature S= md mod m fine d, e seloted by de= (mo. 4(m) signature man be verfier by forming se sim Se = m de moun = m mu(n) = m Menage diget noundly und to reduce computation required. Public beg signatures count he repudiation since can be wester only by prints beg. Additionally can be western by any party who has signature was be verying by any party who has ble putoin hen poin. 1(6) Use of 3 are public has exponent meduce computation agains to class synature. If 3 is a fortan of $\phi(n)$ it court he were gin e met he relature, princ la \$(n) f x ample ((c) fet p= 23 q=29. $\phi(n) = 22 \times 28 = 616$ 3 is relating pie la 616 and many thefre han. Let p= 19 9=23 \$(m)= 18x 22 = 396 and 36 a fortor. so come he wed.

1 (a) Private hey man he found by ming Embas algorith for e=3 and (m)= 616 In this case it is surple to note that de = 1 mod 616 where 12d & 615 de = 617gr1233

1233 and moting that 1233 = 411 x 3 d= 411

Any menage to be signed mut be smaller than the modulus in

 $n = p \times q = 23 \times 29 = 667$ Mar bit land is thefree 512 bits = 2°) (2 4 < 667 < 2)

(e) Menage = 01100100 = 4 + 32+64=100 Synotre = 11010001 = 1 + 16+64+128

To vail signe for (209) 3 mod 667 = 9,129,329 man 667

100 and significe is herfield.

2 (a) Theny

A weak is one of the following

\$ 56 zero.

56 ones

28 zero followe by 28 ores.

28 ones

"" zeros.

A week heig is its own innerse. If it well to form a pseudo random block sequence for a Stream eigher the sequence will snigsty alternate blocks.

There are 4 weaks heres.
Pord size of ken space = 256.

Probability of choosing a new ly = 4/256

Then

2(b) Triple DES involves the following

EK, -> BK2 -> EK,

(ie. enwapt word k, decapt with ke as enwapt with k, again)

Effect in her len U is 128 bits

Courie He followin

In them such a system come be attacked if a small rule of plain last farshe last pain

are available

If m, c, are sent a pair draw up a tolog of position ofps of found by even ken k, on m, Orde or in some way. Then do never for the pombe riputs that were her given of by application of all positive beys kr. Metan the fit tolde's OP with several tables inputs. Repeat for other plain last l'apper last pain until only one motel. Work involved is equivalent (on any) to len than 10 56 bit exhaulte by secules. Effective ben land is there a lot len the 128 50s.

Nen

2 (c) Let Xa, Xb, Xc' an Xa' Le He 0/ps y Xa, Xa, Xa m xa m igst.

If Ka en are und en ingots.

Yin = Xa' (Xa (Xa () Yout) + (Xb () Yout) = Xa 🗗 Xb

I'm is unchanged an -: ' tot is whom.

The olps are

Xa & Yout am X's & Tom

but Xa' = Xa & York

: Xa @ Yat = Xa.

Suren for X6, Xc - Xa.

 $2(a) \times_a = 0 A C 4 = 4 + 12 \times 16 + 10 \times 256 5$ = 2756 Ka = 1 C 2 5 = 5 + 2 x 16 + 12 x 256 + 16 x 256 = 7205 Xa = Xa x Ka (mod 2 16 + 1) = 19,856,980 maa 2"+1 = 64,806 = 15 x 4096 + 13 x 256 + 2 x 16 + 6 = FD26X 5 = F20E = 15 x 4096 + 2 x 256 + 14 = 61966 Kb = 002A = 13 x 256 + 2 x 16 + 10 = 3370 Xc = X6 + K6 mod 216 = 65336 = 15 x 4096 + 15 x 2 56 + 3 x 16 + 8 = FF38

20 It would be positive to

3(a) A good memage digert furtion should have the following proporties:

For a given men age m and men age diget MD

it showed he ingranting to fin me from MD.

In addition it showed he happart in to fin

for menoges m, an are which has the saw MD.

for menoges m, an are which has the saw MD.


If it were possible to per har menoges well such

MD a signed menoge words he mergher by on-the

unthout moreholding synathe.

If the MD is too short them it must be promise though the Burtholes Paradox to fin two menages with some MD. For example for a 64 but MD it works be necessary to check of 222 possible menages to fin a witch.

3(b) (36 works as shown below.



Counte Mode as shown below.

for desuption in counter made surply wherehouse ex one m:

Comba Made word he preferre for a look up Valste. Escence

3(c) The IV has the tollowing was

- (1) If the same bey is used to enough the solary statement every month then without an IV and change in solaries will be sureducted apparent
- (ii) An email menoge hypinely (buts in a standard way (e.g. Dec Si a Hi etc). An exhautic

(iii) If the Ken is not changed the MAC world he predictable for a standard memore.

Grunu

3(a). The protect is allular due helow

A Hu (Ra), RB

Hu (RB)

This protocol is valuerable to a replay attack. A world start a remion and when attack. A world start a remion may a new remion win challenged with RB open up a new remion win RB as its own challenge. When B nepting with Hk (RB) A can complete the first senion and alsounds.

Ha) Layer I is physical leyer. A suipe line energetor would provide security at this Layer.

Layer 2 is purtout les link data layer. A. protocol constitue lie encryptor posities security at this lage.

Lage 7 is the application layer. Adding seemin to specific transtion in an application program is effection seems of this layer.

hayer I may be used effectivels to proving proving on a point to point telesommenication lunk (eg the line from a boarde outlet to a pourising centre). Lager 2 mans he was to an X- L5 on FR stored vintual printe natural. Layer 7 is but and for complex transations (e.g. payment authent notin in banking)

4 (b) Them

Lie 1 A ank for communication an offen ciphers which it supports. A also transmits random number Ryalish will be me later to form a key. Lin 2 B sends A its contificate which working B's public beg. B aijon A He explans it has chosen ar us own random number RB.

Fine 3 A choose pre-moster seemst & and pulsicio hay seems this enempted under B's moster they

A also sends a hosh of the handshake newayes. This and a hosh of the handshake newayes. This proves A knows bey are that handshake menages have not been aftered.

Lie 4 B pores by the hart the beauth wenges are the being k am that all household wenges are unabled. This who pours B hours its own amalled. This who pours have enoshed it he find S. printe bey which would have enoshed it he find S.

In the following A has authorized B but A has B has not authorized A.

SSL is appropriate for most hub browsen,

4(c) Then

In transport much IPSue information's insented into the parket as show below

IP have Topology

By contract in turned made a new IP because is usual for the turned

ANT hoding Sen Then There & party party

For fiewall to fieurall communication a Kamel would be boult between the fieuralls. Either much to IPVPNs.

4(a) Two ways for delegating wight are by 'forwardable' are 'proxidate' TGTs. A 'forwardable' 767 man he enchanged for a TGT with another network address. In the love of with another network address. In the use to separate titlets a 'proxidate' T&T it may be used to separate titlets a 'proxidate' T&T it may be used to separate titlets.

As examples A might with B to proving some batch tank overnight. In the forwardship the a B has a TGT for A which it exchange to a titlet. In the providing time A province B with the titlet it needs.

5 (a) A partet feller man he set up in a finewall to box any articles comivered underent the partocal fier in A parket tille examines the partocal fier in the IP header and man deadure for example it the IP header and man deadure for example it (i) a remote hogin is being attempted. The filter spots the same reduce is outning the would are the spots the same reduce is outning the would are the spots the same reduce is borread. In the com of and the communication is borread. In the com of and the communication is borread. In the com

out siere the france the parket filte much examine the TCP benever for a ACK flag. If it is not then are the same address is outside the wall them it follows a serious is being much stay from outside are will be borned.

5 (b) Finewalls can be effective in borring centain types of communications as discurred above. However they are defenden against any compromise of massives minimes their wall of protection.

in a security ander one as follows.

Downpar Phu.

- development should not be andertaken in a lie system - a development markie should be uned.
- the software duranges are outnier the control of the bornte there needs to be some HR/secants checks and ugular audit to prevent trapdoms being but into progress.
- the siting of a live back tommire in the ISP's premies is a lunge mink to frame.
- although it is not the prinipped threat the communications that the Interest Showen he pertented by for orange IP Sec.

Quations Phose

- Here is little watered author of customes who and seek connect ion to the server. It is Any one man obstain amount details without any authorisation to use an amount. Application shows he is wonting an any passwords share he posted to the amount hidder at his mond notes. Login's should be sent mon copate we.

- Have needs to be UR/seemby wontrols a help desh staff who would perpetrate fraud

- Here is no mention of chargin parsures or of any repeat author water.
- even with good authortuntin at regulation and with all transaction some limit must be plane on transations (eg. declie same day

thems

- (1) A chain of certificates allows a direct party to be ventired by intermediate in the chain. Eg if A signs B's continte an a signs A's certifice, D signs C's careful sta Hen He down to B is through D are C are A.
- (ii) A Contificte Revolute that is a purchased lit of all certifices revoked at a particule time.
- (iii) A trust anchor is an autry whose public bey is known and trusted in achome.

6 (b) Although PGP makes use of much the same algorithms and PEM the familiar part of a public bey infrestruture, menuch tout anchor, certificials, certificate verocata lit, are larking. PGP is follows the anarshy smooth for a PKI and the mer must to a certain extent take plate bays at fore value. By contrast PEM has a strait Centificate Hierarchy in which CAS has a strait Centificate Hierarchy in which CAS are classified amond ing to security level exhibited and man be trusted to security of the Same and man be trusted to security of the Same security level. In that sense PEM is a more security level. In that sense PEM is a more security level. In that sense PEM is a more

(6) Non represent ion in an electronic mail apolem is the property which prevents the senere from danging he sent the memage.

In a public bey system the proposing follows from the use of digital signatures which can be control only by the holder of the prints bey. In a secret bey system a third party or not any is required to premier non-repudiation

A sends an arbent water name to the notion using she court should with the Notion. The Notion was the he authorities and using his sum secret whether he are a seal (a waptographin hash) of the wester a seal (a waptographin hash) of the menage and A's have which it appears to the summar. The search is search to 13 authorities by N and The search is search which can be used to to congin N's seal which can be used to to

prone A sent the menon.

6(a) A an B shared enough their communications and send through a third party who much adultionably send out a large nature of during men ages. The during men ages obscerned that that A an B are communicating though the third party.

6 (e) Exame

The primip of should choose a sersion bey at various and energy to the menage wing some standard secret bey algorithm that an DES or TOEA. He should then exempt the remin bey will some of the respect, public bey and allow the mandards, every tent senior bay to each sopry of the memory sent.