



**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Wednesday 9 November 2005 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET—INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this booklet until instructed to do so.
This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
Section A page 2
Section B page 5
Section C page 8

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses [...]; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources relate to Stalin's cult of personality.

SOURCE A *Extract from **Stalin** by Isaac Deutscher, London, 1965. It refers to the year 1929.*

Stalin's ascendancy was now complete... In the last day of the year Moscow celebrated his fiftieth birthday as if it had been a great historic event. From every corner of Russia tributes were addressed to the Leader. His virtues were praised, excessively and crudely, by every party secretary in the country. The walls of Moscow were covered with his huge portraits. His statues and busts filled the squares, the halls of public buildings, the windows of every shop. "Stalin is the Lenin of today," the propagandists shouted themselves hoarse. Some of the older people recalled Lenin's fiftieth birthday. It had been a small and modest occasion, which Lenin reluctantly attended only to remonstrate [argue] with his admirers for their growing fondness [liking] for pomp and ceremony. The new Stalinist cult was now visibly merging with the old Leninist cult, and overshadowing it. When, on ceremonial occasions, Stalin appeared at the top of the Lenin mausoleum [tomb] in Red Square, Lenin's huge tomb appeared to be only the pedestal for his successor.

SOURCE B *Extract from a speech by a delegate, the writer A O Avienko, to the Seventh Congress of Soviets, 1935.*

Thank you, Stalin. Thank you because I am joyful. Thank you because I am well. No matter how old I become, I shall never forget how we received Stalin two days ago. Centuries will pass, and the generations still to come will regard us as the happiest of beings, because we were privileged to see Stalin, our inspired leader.

The men of all ages will call on his name, which is strong, beautiful, wise and marvellous. His name is engraved on every factory, every machine, every place on earth and in the hearts of all men.

Every time I have found myself in his presence I have been overcome by his strength, his charm, his greatness.

SOURCE C *Extract from **Joseph Stalin: a short officially approved biography**, by G F Alexandrov, and others, Moscow, 1947.*

Stalin is the brilliant leader and teacher of the Party, the great strategist of the socialist revolution, military commander, and guide of the Soviet state. An undying hatred towards the enemies of socialism, faithfulness to principles, firmness and clarity of aims and policies, wise and practical leadership, as well as keeping contact with the people, these are the features of Stalin's style.

After Lenin, no other leader in the world has been called upon to direct such a great number of workers and peasants.

Everybody is familiar with his faultless logic, his clear mind, his iron will, his devotion to the Party, and his love for the people. ... Stalin is the worthy continuer of the cause of Lenin, or, as it is said in the party, "Stalin is the Lenin of today."

SOURCE D *Extract from **A History of Twentieth Century Russia** by Robert Service, London, 1997.*

Stalin had a craving for adulation [flattery], official text books exaggerated his importance. Articles on the Civil War treated the battles around Tsaritsyn in 1918, when Stalin was serving on the Southern front, as the turning point in the Red Army's fortunes, and Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad. Outwardly he rejected claims to greatness, complaining to a film scriptwriter: "Reference to Stalin should be removed, and the Central Committee of the Party put in its place." He also turned down the proposal that Moscow should be renamed Stalinodar [Stalin's gift]. His modesty was insincere, but he knew that it would increase his popularity among ordinary party members.

The cult of Stalin was also important for the regime. Russians were accustomed to their statehood being expressed by a supreme leader. Any revolutionary state had to promote continuity as well as change. The first Five Year Plan had brought about huge disruption, so the tsar-like image of Stalin was useful to show that the state possessed a strong leader. It was also essential for Stalin to show his continuation of Marxism-Leninism. The heroism, justice, and inevitability of the October Revolution had to be stated repeatedly, and the achievements of the Five Year Plan had to be proclaimed.

SOURCE E

*A 1932 poster by Demi proclaiming the results of the first Five Year Plan (reproduced in **The World This Century** by Neil DeMarco, London, 1997.)*



The banner above Stalin states “5 Year Plan in 4 years”. The figures on the left represent opposition to the plan.

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to industrial developments in the first Five Year Plan (1953-57)

SOURCE A *Extract from **Mao Tse-Tung** by Stuart Schram, Harmondsworth, 1966.*

Down to 1955, the economic policy of the Peking Government was generally moderate. Businessmen and industrialists were deprived of effective control over their own enterprises, but most retained all or part of their property rights, and continued to draw some profits.

The first five-year plan was launched in 1953, though details of the plan were only completed in 1955. This first step in changing to a socialist economy was agreed in the Constitution of the Chinese People’s Republic in September 1954... but the pace of transformation remained moderate. Mao stated that it would require several five-year plans to turn China into a highly industrialized country ...

On the whole, planning techniques were based on the Soviet model; heavy industry was emphasized even more than in the first Soviet plan of 1929-34, but this was explained by the imbalance of the pre-1949 Chinese economy, in which most of the modern sector was composed of light industry.

SOURCE B *Extract from **Shanghai’s Strike Wave of 1957** by Elizabeth J Perry, published in *China Quarterly*, 1994.*

In the spring of 1957, a very large strike wave hit Shanghai, the climax of a national labour protest that had been growing for more than a year. Major labour disturbances broke out at 587 Shanghai enterprises, involving nearly 30 000 workers. More than 200 of these incidents included factory walkouts, while another hundred also involved organising slowdowns of production; more than 700 enterprises experienced less serious forms of labour unrest.

These strikes resulted from severe social strains. In demanding improved welfare and criticising the bureaucracy of local officials, strikers revealed deep divisions within the Chinese working class. Partly a result of pre-1949 experiences and partly a result of the socialisation of industry under communism, these divisions would shape labour unrest for decades ...

Hints about the seriousness of the protests appear in speeches by top leaders, including Mao’s of February 1957, where he commented on strikes, and worker unreliability.

SOURCE C *An account of Liu Shaoqi's address to the Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions, published in China T Pictorial, No 4, April 1958.*

In the first five-year plan the targets for total output value of industrial production were overfulfilled. From 1952 to 1957, the output of steel increased on average by 31.2% a year, that of power by 21.4% and that of coal by 14%. Compared with 1952, the total output value of modern industry in 1957 showed an increase of 132.5%. On average there was a new large factory or mine coming into operation every two days. Now China can turn out jet planes, motor vehicles, sea vessels, locomotives, metallurgical equipment, and various new-type lathes.


SOURCE D *A conversation in 1962, between Malcolm MacDonald, a British diplomat who had established friendly relations with the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, and a Chinese former capitalist, taken from **Inside China** by Malcolm MacDonald, London, 1980.*

I met a “national capitalist” who, before 1949, had owned a woollen factory in Tianjin. After the Communist revolution his expertise was needed for the government industrial programme. At first it was left in his private ownership, provided he managed it in agreement with government policy. In 1954 it became a joint venture between the government and him. He told me that a correct assessment was made of the value of the factory when the government took it over, and they gave him an equivalent sum. Immediately after, the factory was greatly expanded and improved, the government providing the capital. He has continued as general manager, although the government decides its policy in consultation with him and other directors.

In addition to his pay, he will receive a fixed interest payment of 5%, until the government considers he has received full payment for the factory. He is also allowed to live in his former house, attended by his former servants. Nevertheless, in various ways his family's existence is less luxurious than it was, because formerly his factory made large profits. But he added that he was glad at the change in China, that the working people enjoyed a better life.

SOURCE E

A Chinese Propaganda Poster: Through co-operation the electric light was installed, by Zhang Yuqing, published in 1957 by Shanghai Picture Publishing House in a print run of 10 000. It is brightly coloured and the banner on the wall reads "Co-operation for victory".



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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to Soviet-Cuban relations between 1962 and 1968.

SOURCE A A cartoon by Jensen, published in the Sunday Telegraph, a British newspaper, 4 November 1962, three days after President Kennedy announced all Soviet missile bases in Cuba had been destroyed.



The figures in the cartoon are Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev. The broken rocket is labelled “Washington”. The launched rocket is labelled “Mars”.

SOURCE B *Comments by Khrushchev, after his dismissal as First Secretary, on meetings with Castro after the Missile Crisis, in **Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes**, Boston. Full content made public in 1990.*

I talked with him [Castro] later too, after he had already been to the [Soviet Union] twice and was in a different frame of mind. Our meeting was exceptionally warm and allowed for a good exchange of opinions. We discussed the past from hindsight and conducted an analysis of the events in a calm atmosphere. I saw that he still did not understand... He still believed that we had installed the missiles not so much in the interests of Cuba, but primarily in the military interests of the Soviet Union and the whole Soviet camp.

I told Castro, “There is another aspect to this business. You wanted to start a war with the United States. If the war had begun we would somehow have survived, but Cuba no doubt would have ceased to exist. It would have been crushed into powder. Yet you suggested a nuclear strike!...” At the time Castro was a very hot-tempered person. We understood that he failed to think through the obvious consequences of a proposal that placed the planet on the brink of extinction.

SOURCE C *Extract from **Profiles in Power: Castro** by Sebastian Balfour, London, 1990.*

Castro’s assertiveness towards Moscow derived from a new sense of confidence. While the Sino-Soviet dispute had weakened the socialist bloc, it also gave Cuba a certain influence over the Soviet Union, which was anxious to keep Cuba on its side. Castro was careful, however, to keep his distance from the Chinese, who were trying to exploit the differences between Havana and Moscow. The limited support given to North Vietnam by both the Chinese and the Soviet Union raised the possibility of a third alignment of socialist forces including Hanoi, the Vietcong, the Cubans, and North Korea. The resistance of the North Vietnamese under the onslaught of American bombs must have been a source of immense encouragement to the Cuban leaders. Moreover, Cuba enjoyed the sort of prestige among Third World nations and in many sections of public opinion in the West that Moscow could hardly ignore.

SOURCE D *Extract from Fidel Castro by Robert Quirk, New York, 1993.*

Since the early 1960s Fidel Castro and the occupants of the Kremlin [Soviet leaders] had engaged in a continuing game of more or less polite blackmail. Though their strategic aims differed, each side had need of the other and recognized the limits beyond which it could not go. Havana was fully aware that the success of the Cuban economy depended ultimately on decisions made by Soviet leaders. The country's industry – its factories, its mechanized state farms, its power-and-light system – ran on oil shipped from the Black Sea. As the Cuban economy expanded, so did its fuel requirement. By 1966 they had begun to run short, and in 1967 the Cubans asked Moscow to increase their deliveries by eight percent... Moscow would agree to add only a token two percent. The intent was clear though unstated – Fidel Castro should begin to behave himself if he expected more economic aid. In his New Year's address, he stressed the seriousness of the problem in 1968. He refused to concede or admit fault, and he put the blame for the energy crisis on the Soviet Union.

SOURCE E *Extract from a speech given by Fidel Castro to the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, August 1968.*

We are here tonight to analyse the situation in Czechoslovakia. Some of the things we are going to say will, in some cases, conflict with the emotions of many. What cannot be denied is that the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was violated. From a legal point of view this cannot be justified. Not the slightest trace of legality existed. This action constitutes a bitter and tragic situation for the people of Czechoslovakia. In our opinion, the decision to invade Czechoslovakia can only be explained from a political point of view. We acknowledge the bitter necessity that called for the sending of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia. We do not condemn the socialist countries that made that decision. We had no doubt that the political situation in Czechoslovakia was deteriorating and that the regime was heading towards capitalism and into the arms of imperialism. This would have dealt a strong blow to the interests of the worldwide revolutionary movement.
