

**ADVANCED GCE****HISTORY**

Historical Investigations 1799–1955

**2589**

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet

**OCR Supplied Materials:**

- 16 page Answer Booklet

**Other Materials Required:**

None

**Wednesday 21 January 2009****Afternoon****Duration:** 1 hour 30 minutes**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Write your name clearly in capital letters, your Centre Number and Candidate Number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet.
- Use black ink. Pencil may be used for graphs and diagrams only.
- Read each question carefully and make sure that you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

**INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES**

- The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **90**.
- This paper contains questions on the following seven Options:
  - Napoleon I (pages 2–3)
  - Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80 (pages 4–5)
  - Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71 (pages 6–7)
  - Roosevelt's America 1920–41 (pages 8–9)
  - Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24 (pages 10–11)
  - Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39 (pages 12–13)
  - Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55 (pages 14–15)
- Answer on **one** Option only. In that Option, answer the Passages question, and **one** other question.
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Passages of the one Option you have studied.
- You are advised to spend equal time on the Passages question and the essay you select.
- In answering the Passages question, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you explain and evaluate the interpretations in the Passages, as well as to inform your answer.
- In answering an essay question, you are expected to refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations to help you develop your arguments.
- This document consists of **16** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

## Napoleon I

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 1** and **ONE** other question.

- 1** Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon's **main** aim in European states was to give them the benefit of French ideas and systems of government. **[45]**

- A** From: V. Cronin, *Napoleon*, published in 1971. This historian argues that Napoleon sought to bring the benefits of the French Revolution to Europe.

The basis of Napoleon's rule of his Empire was military strength. So in all subject states Napoleon kept French troops to preserve order, to prevent invasion and to ensure taxes were paid. The people of the Empire paid the cost. The argument was that the Empire had to pay for the benefits received and the benefits were the rights of man. Napoleon brought to every corner of the Empire equality and justice as embodied in the Civil Code. He wished to free the peoples of Europe and train them towards self-government. Napoleon as Emperor wrote hundreds of letters initiating improvements, cutting down expenditure, ordering reforms. Napoleon wrote to his brother Jerome, King of Westphalia, in 1807: 'The benefits of the Code Napoleon, public trial, and the introduction of juries, will be the leading features of your government. I want your subjects to enjoy a degree of liberty, equality and prosperity previously unknown to the German people.'

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- B** From: R. Dufraisse, *Napoleon*, published in 1992. This historian argues that the ability of Napoleon to introduce changes was dependent on the particular situation of the areas concerned.

It is incorrect to imagine that Napoleon sought to spread the benefits of the French Revolution across Europe. He could not have done so if he had wanted to. His power to intervene in the internal affairs of states under French influence was not limitless, except in governments run by his own family, or in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In no other state did he impose the Civil Code. If princes adopted French policies, they did so with the aim of increasing their power or meeting French military and economic demands. Napoleon did introduce constitutions in states run by his family such as Westphalia, Naples and Spain. Bavaria, Baden and Frankfurt gave themselves constitutions along the French line, but there was never an exact copy of the French model.

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- C** From C. J. Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon*, published in 1995. This historian argues that Napoleon aimed to exploit the Empire to serve his military and dynastic ambitions

Napoleon identified himself with the ideals of the Revolution. During the Consulate and Empire this association was central to French propaganda. In exile on St Helena, Napoleon portrayed himself as the champion of liberty and progress. There was, however, a darker reality. Napoleon did strive to remodel Europe, but he did not do so for the good of the people. On the contrary, if the empire experienced reform, it was so that it could serve him all the better. Hand in hand with exporting the French model went the most ruthless exploitation, and in practice this took priority. Napoleon said, 'I have only conquered kingdoms to serve the interests of France'. Over and over again reform was undermined by the crushing burden of Napoleon's wars. Where the emperor wanted to win the support of traditional elites, the abolition of feudalism was diluted. When he wanted to reward his followers with great estates, administrative reform was set aside. When schools competed for resources with armies, it was the latter that won.

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- D** From: G. Ellis, *The Napoleonic Empire*, published in 2003. This historian argues that the changes brought by Napoleonic rule were often extensive but also had to serve the needs of France.

Changes in government on the French model were effective and long-lasting wherever they were directly implemented for any length of time, or were substantially imitated by other sovereigns. These changes included: imposing an authoritarian and centralised administration in the state; efficient tax collection; codification of the laws; strict government control of aristocratic and clerical bodies; taking over of Church property; the wider recruitment of administrative and legal officials from a new class of bourgeois notables; equality under the law; religious toleration; and new methods of policing. However, Napoleonic imperialism also developed as a system to be exploited according to the needs of Napoleon and France. So changes in the subject states were often adjusted to serve Napoleon's military, dynastic and social aims. 40  
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Answer **either**

- 2** Assess the view that Napoleon's rule in France was nothing more than a dictatorship. **[45]**

**or**

- 3** Assess the view that Napoleon's attempt to defeat Britain through the Continental System was the **main** cause of his downfall. **[45]**

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

## Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 4** and **ONE** other question.

- 4 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the social reforms of Disraeli's ministry of 1874–1880 represented a new focus on the working class for the Conservative Party. [45]

- A** From: Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill*, published in 1970. This historian believes that Disraeli did not want to carry out radical reform.

The principal Conservative measures added up to a substantial amount of social reform, but not to a major new departure. Disraeli took up the social reform cry in opposition largely because there was a general move in that direction and because it was likely to divide the Liberals. In office he was bound to do something. Taking no action would be a recipe for disaster. But there was no question of an alliance between the Tories and the working class and the working class was kept at a distance. A really vigorous policy on behalf of the working class would run into conflict with another great electoral force, namely the middle class. The middle classes began to be frightened by Gladstonian Liberalism and working class militancy and so moved towards conservatism. It was vital to avoid doing anything which would frighten away these new allies.

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- B** From: T.A. Jenkins, *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Disraeli followed a new policy in some aspects.

Disraeli encouraged a more constructive Conservative policy by indicating his intention to devote the energies of the party to social legislation, even if he never specified what that legislation was going to be. Such was the message of his 1872 speeches. In power he was faithful to his view that useful, uncontroversial social reform measures were now an appropriate form of action for the Conservatives, as opposed to the Liberal obsession with attacking national institutions like the Church and the House of Lords. One area, which was different was the reform of the laws relating to trade unions. Richard Cross, the Home Secretary, went further than the recent Royal Commission had recommended and conceded all the demands of the Trades Union Congress. Disraeli enthused about this and claimed it would end the conflict between capital and labour and 'gain and retain for the Tories the lasting affection of the working classes'.

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- C** From: Angus Hawkins, *British Party Politics, 1852–1886*, published in 1998. This historian considers that Disraeli's reforms were impressive but not a new departure.

The Conservative legislation of 1874–6 was the single greatest package of social reforms passed in the nineteenth century. It was an impressive fulfilment of Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech. 'One Nation' Toryism was born. But the measures, although impressive, arose more as practical responses to particular problems than as a result of new thinking in the party. They were based on ideas about social responsibility, treating everyone humanely and the desire to preserve the society of their day. Many Liberals felt similarly and the measures were not radically different from those a Liberal government would have introduced. They did not mark a new departure but were seen as common sense reforms to deal with matters clearly needing reform. The intervention of the state to help the working classes was not enthusiastically embraced. The reforms aimed at voluntary, not enforced, improvement.

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- D** From: Ian St. John, *Disraeli and the Art of Victorian Politics*, published in 2005.  
This historian argues that the reforms had both practical and political aims.

By the standards of the time the Tory government pursued a distinctive social programme to help the working class. Disraeli recognised that the working class had to be persuaded to support the established social and political system. In 1875 he declared social reform to be 'a policy round which the country can rally' and to this end he tried to remove grievances and sustain harmony between rich and poor, employer and employee, which he held to be the natural state of society. The social reform programme was a sustained move in this direction. But Disraeli did not see the state as the main means of social improvement. It could right a specific wrong and restore harmony between rich and poor, but it was for individuals, notably the aristocracy and institutions like the Church, to lead the country into unity and freedom from civil disorder.

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Answer **either**

- 5** Assess the role of Gladstone in shaping the Liberal Party by 1868. **[45]**

**or**

- 6** Assess the view that Disraeli's policies regarding the Eastern Question were in British interests. **[45]**

*Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

### Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 7** and **ONE** other question.

- 7** Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Bismarck deliberately treated Austria leniently in the Treaty of Prague of 1866. **[45]**

- A** From: W.N. Medlicott, *Bismarck and Modern Germany*, published in 1965. This historian argues that there was nothing particularly lenient about the treaty imposed on the Austrians and their allies.

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- B** From: A.J.P. Taylor, *Bismarck – The Man and Statesman*, published in 1967. This historian argues that Bismarck did not have any clear plans for Germany after the defeat of Austria and did not foresee the possible consequences of his victory.

The terms of the Treaty of Prague were agreed with Austria. She was to withdraw from Germany, to consent to a new German Confederation under Prussia and to surrender Schleswig. Prussia also kept their word to Italy and insisted that she should be given Venetia. However, Bismarck did not go an inch beyond this. Despite what he later claimed in his writings, he had no clear aim after the victory of 1866. Having got what he wanted from her he was prepared to leave Austria alone. Eventually all Germany would be united; and this would mean the break up of the Austrian Empire – but Bismarck was no longer a man in a hurry and could wait. He was content to leave the south German states in their ‘international independent existence’ and said repeatedly, ‘we have done enough for our generation’. For Bismarck, the German problem had been settled. Bismarck also felt that as far as France was concerned, there was no reason for conflict and that Napoleon III would welcome the victory of nationalism in Germany, just as he had supported it in Italy.

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- C** From W. Carr, *A History of Germany*, published in 1969. This historian argues that Bismarck's concern for a lenient treaty was driven primarily by short-term considerations.

Bismarck's most difficult task in the summer of 1866 was not to calm France or reassure Russia but simply to restrain the Prussian monarch and his generals. King William had opposed the war to the very last but once it started he worked himself into a fury of moral indignation against Austria, and, supported by his generals, demanded that Austria be severely punished for her misdeeds. For Bismarck the war had served its purpose. Why then needlessly humiliate Austria by taking territories off her and parading Prussian troops through the streets of Vienna? His task, as he remarked to his wife in these critical days, was that of, 'keeping things calm and making it understood that Prussia does not live in Europe alone but with three nations who hate and envy her'. It was only with great difficulty and by reducing himself to a state of nervous exhaustion that he finally persuaded King William to leave Austria intact.

- D** From: Katherine Lerman, *Bismarck, Profiles in Power*, published in 2004. This historian suggests that although Bismarck called for caution he had clear aims as to how he wished to exploit the defeat of Austria with the terms of the Treaty of Prague.

In drawing up the Treaty of Prague in 1866 Bismarck's main interest was in securing the north of Germany for a new confederation led by Prussia and excluding Austria from German affairs. Throughout the negotiations Bismarck kept focused on what for him was the ultimate prize. For example when writing to his son in August that year he claimed 'What we need is north Germany and there we want to make ourselves at home'. Bismarck had quite a struggle to convince King William that this was a just outcome. The King's military outlook not only led him to urge taking the fight on to Vienna but to insist that Prussia was entitled to territorial compensation. In an effort to restrain William's excessive demands Bismarck suffered a nervous collapse and claims to have even considered killing himself. By contrast to the King and his generals, Bismarck was highly satisfied by Austria's commitment to vacate 'Germany' as this effectively gave him a blank cheque to reorganise the German states.

Answer **either**

- 8** To what extent did the military reforms of 1862 enable Prussia to achieve dominance in Germany by 1867? **[45]**

**or**

- 9** 'There was no master plan to unite Germany.' To what extent is this an accurate view of Bismarck's aims in the period from 1867 to 1871? **[45]**

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay*

### Roosevelt's America 1920–41

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 10**, and **ONE** other question.

- 10** Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the Depression was caused primarily by overproduction. **[45]**

- A** From: John Galbraith, *The Great Crash of 1929* published in 1954. This historian suggests that unequal distribution of income within the USA was a major problem.

There seems little question that in 1929 the US economy was fundamentally unsound. Many things were wrong such as the bad distribution of income. In 1929 the rich were extremely rich. It seems certain that the top 5% of the population with the highest incomes in that year received about one-third of all personal income. The proportion of personal income received in the form of shares and rent was about twice as great as in the years following the Second World War. This highly unequal income distribution meant that the economy was dependent on a high level of investment or a high level of luxury consumer spending or both. If the rich are to spend what they receive it must be on luxuries or by the way of investment in new factories. This high spending on luxuries and investment was highly susceptible to the downturn in the stock market in October, 1929.

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- B** From: John Hicks, *The American Nation*, published in 1965. This historian suggests there were serious problems with agriculture.

Economists were able to reach substantial agreement about the main causes of the depression. Among the causes they mention agricultural overexpansion both in the USA and elsewhere. American farmers produced more wheat, cotton, corn and livestock than they could sell at satisfactory prices. During the 1920s agricultural surpluses piled up at home and abroad with a devastating effect on prices. Farm purchases steadily declined, for farmers had less and less to buy. Also mortgages acquired in more prosperous times further limited farmers' purchasing power and drove many to sell their farms.

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- C** From: Maldwyn Jones, *The Limits of Liberty*, published in 1995. This historian argues that the Depression was caused by a combination of different factors.

What caused the Great Depression? Economists disagree, but it is generally accepted that the prosperity of the 1920s had been built on shaky foundations. The most serious underlying weakness was that the capacity to produce had outrun the capacity to consume. One reason was that a substantial part of the population (farmers, and workers in declining industries such as coal and textiles) had not shared in the general prosperity. Another was that income was maldistributed. Profits had risen much faster than wages while tax policy favoured the wealthy. The mass of people, though better off than before, were unable to buy their share of consumer goods thereby sustaining production levels. In addition, the American banking system was inherently unsound. Unlike most industrialised countries the USA had large numbers of small independent banks. Inadequate regulation and incompetent and dishonest management meant that in the 1920s, 5000 banks had failed. A further element of instability was the rapid expansion of hire-purchase schemes, which sustained purchasing power for a time but could not go on indefinitely. The combination of all these factors explains the severity of the Depression when it began in 1929.

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- D** From: Alan Farmer and Vivienne Sanders, *American History 1860–1990*, published in 2002. These historians suggest that problems with world trade were a serious economic issue.

Scholars, like politicians, disagree about the causes of the Depression. The USA was unable to sell its surplus products overseas. Its high tariff policies had resulted in many countries placing similarly high tariffs on American goods. Some stress the chaotic financial situation after 1918. In the 1920s the USA provided Germany with massive amounts of short-term loans. Germany used these to pay reparations to Britain and France. They, in turn, used the money to pay interest on US war debts. This money was returned to Germany in loans. Once US bankers stopped investing in Germany it caused a world-wide economic collapse. Also some economists point the finger at Britain, which went off the gold standard in 1931. This caused instability in the world money markets and in world trade. Over 5000 US banks collapsed a month after Britain abandoned the gold standard.

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Answer **either**

- 11** Assess the view that the failure of National Prohibition was due **mainly** to problems of enforcement. [45]

**or**

- 12** To what extent did the United States follow an isolationist foreign policy from 1920 to 1941? [45]

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

### Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power, 1903–24

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 13** and **ONE** other question.

- 13** Using these **four** passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the Bolsheviks won the Civil War (1918–21) largely as a result of the use of terror. **[45]**

- A** From: E. Acton, *Russia*, published in 1986. This historian argues that the Bolsheviks came close to defeat during the Civil War, but had some underlying advantages.

In the Civil War the Bolsheviks came close to disaster. Deprived of the major grain-surplus areas and blockaded from the outside world, they suffered from desperate shortages of everything – food, footwear and guns. Hopes that revolution would spread into Western Europe continued to run high, and in March 1919 Lenin founded the Communist International (Comintern) to rally socialists abroad but bourgeois Europe withstood post-war unrest. The Bolsheviks were forced to rely on their own efforts. The low point was reached in October 1919 when both Petrograd and Moscow seemed on the brink of falling. Their eventual victory is explicable partly in terms of the military advantage gained by control of the Russian heartland. This gave them unbroken and relatively short lines of communication, an asset brilliantly exploited by the Red Army officers gathered under Trotsky. But more fundamental was the fierce loyalty they attracted from many workers, and peasant preference for Reds over Whites. The lower classes fought to defend the Revolution.

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- B** From: B. Williams, *The Russian Revolution*, published in 1989. This historian argues that Bolshevik victory owed a great deal to the weaknesses of the White armies.

The White movement was deeply split – between socialists and liberals and between politicians and soldiers. Some groups looked to Germany, others remained loyal to their wartime allies, Britain and France. Often conflicts were as fierce between different White armies as between them and the Reds. The Bolsheviks, by moving the capital to Moscow, controlled the all-important railway network, and communications between Kolchak and Denikin often relied on men on horseback. Military advances were not coordinated and the Bolsheviks were able to defeat their enemies one by one. The brutality of the White armies, their wholesale shooting of prisoners and their encouragement of anti-Jewish massacres were well documented and widely publicized by the Bolsheviks.

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- C** From: P. Oxley, *Russia: From Tsars to Commissars*, published in 2001. This historian argues that Trotsky and the Red Army played a crucial role in the Bolshevik victory.

The Red Army did not exist in March 1918, but in 1920 it was five million strong. In 1918 the Communists introduced conscription into the areas they controlled, and although they suffered heavy desertions, they had almost limitless human resources to draw upon. It has been estimated that the largest combined total of White forces facing the Reds at any one time was no more than 500,000 and they were divided between different armies. Greater numbers alone do not win wars, though they certainly help. Trotsky also reintroduced ranks and military discipline into the Red Army. To remedy his lack of experienced officers against much opposition within his party, Trotsky recruited 50,000 former Tsarist officers. To ensure their loyalty on the battlefield, he also appointed Bolshevik political commissars to supervise the officers and maintain the troops' morale. Trotsky also created a large force of Red cavalry, which played an important role in disrupting enemy lines of communication and countering the Cossack forces in the south.

- D** From: M. Lynch, *Bolshevik and Stalinist Russia*, 1918–56, published in 2005. This historian emphasises the importance of terror in helping to secure victory for the Bolsheviks.

So severe was the suppression by the Bolsheviks of their internal enemies that it gained the title Red Terror. The chief instruments by which it was imposed were the Cheka and the Red Army, both of which played a critical role during the Civil War. In essentials, the Cheka was a better-organised and more efficient form of the Tsarist secret police. Its express purpose was to destroy 'counter-revolution and sabotage', terms that were so general they could be applied to cover anything of which the Bolsheviks disapproved. Some Bolsheviks were uneasy about the relentless savagery of the Cheka but there were no attempts to restrict its powers. The majority of party members accepted that the hazardous situation they were in justified the severity of the repression. The foreign interventions and the Civil War, fought out against the background of famine and social disorder, threatened the existence of the Communist Party and the government. This had the effect of stifling criticism of the Cheka's methods.

Answer **either**

- 14** Assess the view that weak leadership was the **main** reason the Bolsheviks had achieved limited impact in Russia by 1914. [45]

**or**

- 15** Assess the view that Lenin was largely responsible for securing power for the Bolshevik Party in Russia in October 1917. [45]

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

### Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–1939

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 16** and **ONE** other question.

- 16** Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Britain's main reason for conciliating Germany in the 1920s was economic self-interest. **[45]**

- A** From *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, published in 1934. Britain's Prime Minister from 1916–22 reflects on the impact of World War One and the need for peace.

The war had killed ten million of the finest young men of the world in the flower of their strength and crippled and mutilated many millions more. It had devastated many millions more. It had shattered the intricate mechanisms of international trade and left a great mass of confusion and wreckage which would take a generation to clear. It had poisoned the mind of mankind with suspicions and resentments, misunderstandings and fears which are still a menace. Healthy goodwill and neighbourliness to other nations are the only abiding guarantee of peace on earth.

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- B** From A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, published in 1961. This historian argues that Britain increasingly saw the treatment of Germany in the Treaty of Versailles as unjust.

The British government had been eager for revenge and reparations. Soon, however, the British attitude changed. The British government began to denounce the folly of reparations once they themselves had carried off the German merchant navy. Their more practical approach was to restore the economic life of Europe so as to promote the recovery of their own export industries. They listened readily to German stories of the endless miseries which would follow the payment of reparations; and once they had condemned reparations, they soon condemned the other clauses of the peace treaty. Reparations were wicked. Therefore the disarmament of Germany was wicked; the frontier with Poland was wicked; the new national states were wicked. And not only wicked; they were a justified German grievance, and the Germans would be neither content nor prosperous until these aspects of the Treaty were undone.

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- C** From Richard Overy, *The Road to War*, published in 1969. This historian explains the importance of Britain's overseas trade.

The preservation of world peace, which included the conciliation of Germany, was essential for the survival of Britain's increased world responsibilities. By the late 1920s almost two thirds of Britain's overseas investments and almost half her trade went to the Empire. There was not a year in the 1920s when British forces were not in action in some corner of the Empire. Peace and disarmament were imperative. The War had damaged Britain's trade almost irretrievably; the cost of the war reduced British overseas investments by two thirds. The British economy never recovered the special position that it had before 1914. British trade in 1921 was half the 1913 level; the Government was saddled by a National Debt sixteen times greater in 1920 than it had been in 1910. A foreign policy of peaceful cooperation was essential to safeguard trade and to rebuild foreign investment. Politicians of all parties were reluctant to uphold the letter of the Treaty of Versailles. British politicians of both parties cut defence spending to the bone.

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- D** From Robert Holland, *The Pursuit of Greatness, Britain and the World Role 1900-1970* published in 1991. This historian argues that British foreign policy had a concern for European peace in the 1920s.

Lloyd George had a visionary ideal of a reconstruction of Europe on a new basis in which the United Kingdom would play a leading role. Policy towards Germany was at the heart of this. At a series of conferences, he pressed not only for the scaling down of German war reparations but for the recognition of the need to encourage German recovery as a precondition for international security. When those around him argued that the key to peace was to understand French insecurity, his response was that the problem of insecurity ceased once you stopped thinking about it. The new states in Eastern Europe interested him little. The Soviet Union should be brought into the mainstream of European affairs only as an outlet for Germany's industrial surplus. Austen Chamberlain, whom Baldwin made foreign secretary in 1924, was equally idealistic. He argued that if Britain withdrew from Europe, the chance of permanent peace would be gone and civilization itself might perish. The late 1920s, after the Locarno Treaties, ushered in a famous 'spring time' during which Europe warmed to expectations of peace and prosperity and new harmony with Germany.

Answer **either**

- 17** Assess the view that concern about the inadequacy of British armed forces was the **main** explanation for British policy towards Germany from 1933 to 1938. **[45]**

**or**

- 18** Assess the importance of public opinion in bringing about changes in British policy to Germany in 1939. **[45]**

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

### Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 19** and **ONE** other question.

- 19** Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe from 1944 to 1948 were carried out **mainly** to expand the power of the Soviet Union. **[45]**

- A** From: Stephen J Lee, *Aspects of European History 1789–1980*, published in 1982. This historian argues that Stalin feared the re-birth of Germany after 1945.

Germany became the greatest single source of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West from 1945. Stalin had a profound distrust of Germany. The Soviet Union had suffered devastating losses at the hands of the Nazis in the Second World War. Germany's importance to the West was that it acted as a buffer zone between them and the Soviet *bloc*. The Berlin crisis of 1948 had far reaching significance. It set the pattern for the whole western response to the Soviets. Stalin feared the rebirth of fascist militarism. 5

- B** From: Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia*, published in 1993. This historian argues that Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe were carried out for defensive reasons.

Stalin forged a buffer zone from the ruins of the Nazi empire because the Soviet Union was exhausted by the Second World War and confronted by warlike Americans armed with nuclear weapons which they were evidently willing to use. The damage inflicted on the Soviet Union during the war defies description. Enormous quantities of capital stock had vanished – 679 billion roubles' worth. By 1942 four-fifths of the USSR's total output was allocated to the war effort and there was a catastrophic fall in the standard of living. Globally the Second World War took the lives of between 50 and 60 million people. Of these nearly half – perhaps 28 million – were Soviet citizens. Between 15 and 19 million were civilians, victims of hostage shooting, slave labour, starvation and bombing. 10

- C** From: Steve Phillips, *The Cold War*, published in 2001. This historian argues that the view that Stalin was expansionist needs to be challenged. 15

As leader of the Soviet Union, Stalin was committed to the ideals of the communist revolution, including the principle of world revolution. The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 gave Stalin the opportunity to spread communism throughout Eastern Europe. The Red Army controlled large areas of Eastern Europe and was in a position to enforce Soviet policy. An expansionist and aggressive Soviet foreign policy was viewed by the USA as the product of the totalitarian nature of Stalin's Soviet Union. However, this view of Stalin as an expansionist needs to be challenged. The extension of Soviet control to Eastern Europe can be seen as a defensive measure; the creation of a buffer zone to protect the Soviet Union from invasion by the West. A degree of aggression was deemed necessary by Stalin in order to secure the defence of the Soviet Union. 20

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- D** From: John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War*, published in 2005. This historian suggests that Stalin's aims were to secure his own power and to dominate the continent of Europe.

Stalin's post-war goals were security for himself, his regime, his country and his ideology, in precisely that order. Paranoia and absolute power came together in Stalin. Stalin believed that wartime expenditure in blood and resources should determine who got what after the war. The Soviet Union would therefore get a lot. Not only would they regain territories lost to the Germans during the Second World War, they would also retain the territories they had taken as a result of the non-aggression pact Stalin concluded with Hitler in August 1939. Stalin would also require that the neighbouring states beyond the Soviet Union's expanded borders would remain within Moscow's sphere of influence. Stalin's goal therefore was to dominate Europe as thoroughly as Hitler had tried to do. Stalin acknowledged this when commenting in 1947 that 'had Churchill delayed the Second Front by another year, the Red Army would have come to France. We toyed with the idea of reaching Paris'.

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Answer **either**

- 20** Assess the view that disagreements about the Second Front were the **most** important reason for the collapse of the 'Grand Alliance' by 1945. [45]

**or**

- 21** Assess the view that the nuclear arms race was the dominant factor in East-West relations in Europe during the period from 1948 to 1955. [45]

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*



*Copyright Acknowledgements:*

Text 1A	Extract from V Cronin, <i>Napoleon</i> , p.254 and 265, Fontana, 1971.
Text 1B	Extract from R Dufraisie, <i>Napoleon</i> , pp.120-121, McGraw-Hill, 1992.
Text 1C	Extract from CJ Esdaile, <i>The Wars of Napoleon</i> , pp.71-72 and 97-98, Longman, 1995.
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