

Examiners' Report June 2015

GCE History 6HI03 E

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Introduction

It was pleasing to see a good standard of responses from candidates in the penultimate session of the 6HI03 E examination. Many candidates wrote insightful comments which placed them in the higher grade categories. The paper was divided into two sections: Section (A) was an In-Depth Study question, and Section (B) an Associated Historical Controversy question.

Centres should note that the amount of space provided in the booklet for answers is more than enough for full marks.

Although a few responses were quite brief, there was little evidence on this paper of candidates having insufficient time to answer both questions. The ability range of those entering was diverse but the design of the paper allowed all abilities to be catered for. There were also very few rubric errors. By a large majority, more candidates were entered for E2 - A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944-90 than for E1 - The World in Crisis, 1879-1941.

One positive was the impression that, in general, candidates were able to offer more specific knowledge, particularly in relation to the controversy questions. The discriminating factor in their relative success in applying the knowledge was how well this was integrated with the arguments in the given sources and the precise demands of the question.

One pleasing trend is that very few candidates produced essays which were devoid of analysis. The two main weaknesses in responses which scored less well tended to be: (1) a lack of sufficient knowledge, rather than lengthy descriptive writing without analysis, or (2), informed writing which, whilst analytical in some senses, tended more towards answer a generic version of the given question, e.g. responses that offered seemingly pre-prepared explanations for superpower detente in the 1970s, rather than the specific question asked in Section A, Question 4. The latter issue was also found across the controversies in Section B, with some answers tending more towards the broader controversy than the question as specifically asked. As a result in such cases, engagement with the sources was also often less successful. Overall though, the paper provided candidates with the opportunity to develop their essay writing and to include source material as and when necessary.

At the higher levels, and related to the issue above, a discriminating factor was often the ability to really explore the key words and phrases in the question, such as 'Why, and how significantly', 'massively increased US-Soviet tensions' and 'fundamental clash of competing systems', as well as the common stems such as 'How far do you agree'. Candidates who convincingly applied their knowledge to exploring these issues were very successful. However, candidates should be wary of forcing the use of these, as there were cases where arguments over the 'extent' or the application of key phrases was simply asserted or misapplied.

The previously noted tendency for candidates to analyse and produce judgements in the main body of the answer and have cursory conclusions was to some extent reduced. Candidates should still be minded that considered introductions and conclusions often provide a solid framework for sustained argument and evaluation.

The answers of a minority of less successful candidates in Section A suggested that they lacked the detailed knowledge base required to tackle these questions and produced a catch-all commentary on the stipulated topic, with obvious repercussions. The best answers to Section A questions showed some impressive study of 19th and 20th century international relations with students producing incisive, scholarly analysis.

Question 1

Stronger responses demonstrated a sharp focus on the reasons for peaceful resolution (1905-13) and the reasons for war (1914), thereby offering a balanced analysis which covered both parts of the question. At this level, candidates considered a range of relevant developments/issues, such as (1) one side was diplomatically isolated and prepared to settle (e.g. Algeiras Conference 1906) (2) allies acted as a restraining influence (e.g. First Balkan War 1912) (3) growing German fears of encirclement and the 'blank cheque' removed important constraints in 1914 (4) the alliance system linked the 'peripheral' 1914 Balkan crisis directly to the rival European power blocs. Lower-scoring candidates tended to produce responses with generalised assertions about why war was avoided before 1914 and/or why war broke out in 1914. A few narratives about the international crises of 1905-14 with few or no links to the reasons for peaceful resolution (1905-13) or the outbreak of war (1914) were also found at this level.

Bosnian = '08

First
second
Balkan

Balkan War

SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number: Question 1 ☒ Question 2 ☒
 Question 3 ☒ Question 4 ☒

Why were the Great Powers able to resolve international crises peacefully in the years 1905-13 but unable to prevent war in 1914?

There ~~were~~ ^{are} several reasons for the Great Powers being able to stop the international crises peacefully between 1905-13 but unable to do so in 1914.

Firstly, there was the fact that in 1907 Russia and Britain signed an alliance called the Anglo-Russian Entente. This in turn worried the Germans as the Triple Entente ~~became~~ came out: Europe was now decisively split into two groups and therefore tensions grew raising nationalistic, militaristic and, in order to maintain power, imperialistic talks.

Britain
Arms race
Militarism
Nationalism
Alliances
Germany/colonies

The first Moroccan Crisis (1905-06) fuelled ~~bad~~ a bad relationship between France and Germany. France was irritated that Germany had intervened, by promising support to the Sultan, if France invaded, in an area that she clearly counted as her sphere of influence. However at the Algeiras conference in 1906 only Austria backed Germany and so they had to ~~back~~ ^{step}

(Section A continued) down. Germany felt humiliated and was unprepared to back down again if a second opportunity arose. They also felt resentful that France got control of imports/exports and the police force. This crisis didn't lead to a war because there was a conference that pressurised Germany into backing down.

The next major crisis was the Bosnian in 1908. Austria and Russia were always fighting over the right to control the Balkans. ~~They had agreed~~ As Bismarck said, "if war was likely to break out it would be over something silly in the Balkans." The Austrians and Russians had agreed in ^(C.H.) early 1908 that Austria could annex Bosnia-Herzegovina if Russia could have access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. However, Russia required agreement of other countries it didn't yet have, Austria did not. Later that year (1908) Austria annexed B-H and ~~R~~ Russia was ~~as~~ infuriated as she believed it was implied Austria wait until after she had the required permission. To make matters worse France (Russia's ally) refused to get involved lest she fall out with Germany during the middle of talks with it over ~~the~~ Morocco. Russia became ^{even more} determined to seek revenge on Austria and earn back its prestige for its Pan-Slav ~~that~~ brothers. This Crisis, like the last, though didn't cause war as Austria

~~The Second~~ hadn't ~~technically~~, technically, done anything wrong and, without backing of France, Russia had no choice but to accept.

(Section A continued) The Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911 was a major catalyst of war but didn't in fact cause it because the French and Germans were able to ^{*}come to a secret agreement. However, German ~~aggression~~ aggression within the crisis was not forgotten, it alarmed the members of the Triple ~~Entente~~ Entente and ~~for~~ they started to increase the speed of their Armaments programmes. Also ~~alliances~~ alliances became more militaristic as French and British discuss naval tactics should a war break out, in 1912.

~~The First Balkan War~~ Other reasons included the fact that the naval race between Germany and Britain rose to its peak between these times and thanks to the 2nd Moroccan Crisis so did the arms race. Alongside these two races was a rise in militarism that led to armies ruling ^{a country's} government in a time of peace and war. This was especially the case in Germany. Also because of this military plans were carried out and revised such as the Schlieffen Plan meaning when the opportunity came in 1914 war became inevitable. Also, in 1914 the Assassination was, besides being a matter of pride for the Austrians, a tactical move to crush the threat of Serbia.



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

This Level 2 response illustrates a number of typical weaknesses characteristic of low-scoring essays (1) it relies heavily on general statements about the European crises rather than relevant detailed analysis (2) it fails to address a key part of the question (i.e. why war broke out in 1914), and (3) the answer is rather short



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

To gain high marks on the In-Depth Study question you must have sound subject knowledge. Check the specification for the key topics.

Question 2

Lower-scoring candidates tended to produce (1) narratives about some or all of the 1919-23 peace treaties with few or no links to the victorious powers' 'desire for reconciliation' as the basis for the post-war settlement (2) answers which focused overwhelmingly or exclusively on the Versailles Treaty and thus lacked range, and (3) responses with generalised assertions that the desire for reconciliation did/did not underpin the 1919-23 peace settlements.

Higher-scoring candidates demonstrated a sharp focus on the extent to which the terms of the peace treaties of 1919-23 were based on the victors' desire for reconciliation and addressed both sides of the argument with range and depth. At this level, the analysis included consideration of relevant developments or issues such as self-determination, the use of plebiscites, the creation of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation, war guilt and the imposed nature of the treaties, selective use of the 14 Points, and the pursuit of national self-interest by the Allied powers.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 1 ☒

Question 2 ☒

Question 3 ☒

Question 4 ☒

x:50 9:40
 Peace treaties
 1919 Versailles
 1920 St Germain
 1920 Trianon
 1919 Neuilly
 1920 Sèvres
 1923 Lausanne.
 war guilt 231
 self-interest + punishment
 YES
 - GB wanted to punish Germany
 - Eastern frontiers
 - Danzig, Memel, Poland
 - Poland + Czechoslovakia
 - independent long-term view on stable Europe?
 - no more union combat by Turkish forces.
 - "suffering brought to innocent people"
 - self-determination
 - collect SELF-INTEREST
 - GB - weaken Turkey
 - Fr - protect pre-war investments
 - Turkish resent Greek occupation
 - Mustafa Kemal aggression pays
 DICTAT mentality
 SELF-INTEREST
 short-sighted?
 other factors
 BUT didn't it necessary?

Following the end of the First World War in 1918, the Major ~~World~~ Powers of the time, or the 'Big Four' of Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, Wilson and Orlando, met at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to negotiate peace settlements with the defeated Central Powers. The

(Section A continued)

Treaties that resulted from these discussions are often viewed as controversial, with some historians arguing they were a move towards reconciliation and others taking the view that they were harsh punishment driven by the interests of Britain and France.

The greatest difficulty in the negotiations of these settlements was the differing aims of each of the 'Big Four'. Wilson wanted the introduction of his Fourteen Points which argued for self-determination of peoples, world disarmament and freedom of the seas but these aims conflicted with those of Britain and France in particular. Clemenceau wanted ~~it~~ to 'cripple' Germany, as he had lived through ~~the~~ two German invasions of France, the most recent being the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, and would therefore have been unwilling to take part in world disarmament. Similarly, the ideas of self-determination and freedom of the seas conflicted with Britain's aim of the perpetuation of the British Army.

It can be argued that these peace treaties of 1919-23 were a move towards reconciliation

(Section A continued) as Lloyd-George wanted the preservation of Germany in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles so that Germany may remain a trade partner to Great Britain. Indeed, Lloyd-George argued that Germany should not be completely disarmed, leaving her with an army of 100,000 full-time volunteers. Similarly, whilst many historians view the Versailles Treaty as excessively harsh, in actual fact Germany lost only 13% of her territory, 13% of her economic productivity and 7% of her population. ~~However, the Treaty of Versailles can also be argued to be an extremely harsh treaty due to the~~ In addition to this, it can be argued that the reparations bill of 132 billion gold marks (set in 1921 by the Reparations Committee) were not designed to punish Germany but were rather included out of French necessity as the use of French warfare had wreaked havoc on French infrastructure.

However, the Treaty of Versailles can be argued to be an incredibly harsh treaty due to the inclusion of Article 231: War guilt. This stated that Germany and

(Section A continued) her allies had to take sole responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War, even though the Triple Entente ~~that~~ perhaps were as responsible due to the alliance system, Anglo-German Naval Rivalry and their involvement in the Balkan Crises of 1908-14 which led to the July Crisis and declaration of war. The war guilt clause was to ~~be~~ ^{provide} the moral justifications for the excessive reparations ~~sum~~ ^{sum} for which Clemenceau argued so strongly ~~for~~ ^{the} for the revival of French economy but perhaps also to cripple the German economy so they may never pose a threat to France again. Lloyd-George also supported the argument for the reparations bill so that Germany could not focus their expenditure on the build up of arms or navy as it had in the pre-war years. Another harsh clause was the re-drawing of German ^{Eastern} borders meaning that she lost Danzig, Mäinwerder and Upper Silesia. The Germans of course, argued that this was directly against the principle of self-determination and so it is hard to argue that this Treaty was driven by the desire for reconciliation and indeed

(Section A continued) it caused deep resentment in Germany and is one of the main factors for Hitler's success and popularity in the inter-war years and therefore an important factor in the causation of World War Two in 1939. Indeed, the problems created by the Reparations are clearly exemplified in the 1922 French occupation of the Ruhr which, again, did not suggest reconciliation. It was only with the 1924 Dawes Plan and the 1926 Locarno Treaties ^{which led to Germany joining the League} that one could argue that the Major Powers were finally looking for reconciliation with Germany.

Indeed, it is arguable that the only move towards reconciliation in the Treaties with Germany's allies was the ^{recognition} ~~creation~~ of the independent Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1919 Treaty of 17. German with Austria. This adhered to the principle of self-determination and was perhaps a long-term push towards European peace and stability. However, it can also be argued that Britain and France wanted a strong and independent Poland

(Section A continued) to act as a barrier to Germany and the spread of Communism. These other treaties are also very harsh. The Treaty of St. Germain prevented the *Entente* from going to Germany which created more tension, exemplified by Hitler's 1938 occupation. Indeed, the 1920 Treaty of Trianon was heavily weighted against Hungary, as it lost $\frac{2}{3}$ of territory and ~~44~~ 41.6% of her population. Churchill even said the Treaty brought "suffering to the innocent". The treaties of Neuilly (1919) and Sèvres (1920) also displaced many people in the re-distribution of territory and led to the use of force by Mustapha Kemal to negotiate the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to remove foreign control from Turkey. This would certainly suggest that reconciliation was not in mind in the creation of these treaties as it led to further conflict in the coming years.

These treaties were, then, perhaps driven by the self-interest of the Major Powers and not the 'desire for reconciliation' as France pursued her aims of crucially weakening Germany with, perhaps, blatant disregard for the potential

(Section A continued) impact on Germany. Indeed, self-interest drove Britain too, who wanted the destruction of the German navy and the redistribution of her colonies and ~~this~~ ~~was~~ to protect her interests in the Far-East such as in the decision over Germany's former rights to Shantung. This suggests that these peace-treaties were short-sighted, as many feared the weakened Germany would not be able to resist Soviet Expansionism and the terms with Germany led to the major conflict in 1939.

In conclusion, I believe that whilst there was some progress made towards reconciliation, it certainly did not drive the terms of the peace treaties. Reconciliation came in the League period after 1926 with the Dawes and Young Plans and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928). Instead, I believe that these peace-treaties ^{and their} ~~the~~ ~~dictat~~ ~~mentality of~~ were harsh and were primarily driven by the self-interests of the powers to weaken Germany so that they may strengthen their own nations and the idea of self-preservation. These treaties served only to satiate the selfish

(Section A continued) *desires of the ~~major~~ Britain and France and this indeed had disastrous effects on each of the nations involved in both the short and long term.*



ResultsPlus
Examiner Comments

This Level 5 response offers a precisely focused and sustained analysis of the Allies' motives in drawing up the peace treaties of 1919-23. Care has been taken (1) to focus on key allied aims, and (2) develop the argument across several treaties. Consequently strong range and depth is evident. The arguments deployed are reinforced with detailed own knowledge throughout, and the essay is rounded off with a clear judgement in the conclusion.

Question 3

Stronger responses had a confident grasp of the increased/reduced tensions debate and offered an answer with good range and depth. At this level, features of the nuclear arms race which increased/reduced tensions were analysed (such as the spiralling arms race, nuclear brinkmanship, MAD, and the Berlin and Cuban crises) and convincing development of both sides of the argument was evident. Weaker answers tended to be nuclear arms race narratives with few links to the question set or focused but largely unsupported responses. At this level, a few answers drifted from the question and offered lengthy accounts of other features of the period which increased or reduced US-Soviet tensions such as the death of Stalin and peaceful coexistence. One or two responses focused almost entirely on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 thus omitting most of the 1949-63 time frame.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 1 ☒

Question 2 ☒

Question 3 ☒

Question 4 ☒

Yes

No

fear

————→ MAD —————→ deterrent

~~EMC~~

~~Test ban treaty~~ / 63

Sputnik - '57 } embarrassed

~~hot line~~

ICBMs - '57 } US

Ideological tensions already exist

Inevitable - competition

The development of the Arms Race (1949-63) did not massively increase US-Soviet tensions for two main reasons; tensions already existed, and the development of weapons acted more as a deterrent, than an incentive for war. However, it is also argued that USSR's dominance in rockets was an embarrassment to the US and increased tensions.

Tensions between the US and USSR did not massively increase due to the nuclear arms race (1949-63). Primarily due to the, already, underlying tensions between the two sides. This ~~was~~ pre-existing tension is clear to see with the Berlin Blockade (which ended in 1949) being the closest to direct conflict the two sides had come to, showing tension was already high. If anything, Russia turning nuclear in 1949 actually decreased tension due to the fear of both sides, of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' (MAD). As the name suggests, this idea claimed that if the two sides engaged in thermo-nuclear war, they would both be destroyed due to the fallout and likelihood of a 'nuclear winter' lasting centuries. We

Can, therefore, perceive a decrease in tension between the two sides, as they have to work together more, in order to avoid MAD. However, this view is undermined in the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) in '62 with the two sides reaching the height of Cold War tensions; America reaching 'Def-Con2' for the first time (suggesting thermo-nuclear war was 'likely'). However, even in this case, MAD eventually prevailed and the sides, both, stood down; removing nuclear arms from Cuba (USSR) and Turkey (USA) as well as signing a partial test ban treaty (with both sides limiting tests) and installing a 'hot-line' between the two leaders (both in 1963) in order to avoid a similar situation occurring. This eventual increase in communications and co-operation between the sides was certainly caused by the inevitability of MAD, showing that the development of the arms race, therefore, actually led to tensions decreasing from 1949-63.

On the other hand, ~~the~~ nuclear superiority came into play in Korea (1950-53), with General MacArthur appealing to use nuclear weapons in the war. This was a rather arrogant attitude held by the General and certainly would have heightened US-Soviet tensions, however, due to the carefulness of Eisenhower, this never happened, meaning the nuclear arms race was not responsible for tensions caused by Korea. However, in 1957, Russia's creation of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and launching of Sputnik into space, caused huge embarrassment for the US, who were unable to match this capability held by Russia. This did lead to a small increase in tension; the US were desperate to catch up, but the increase was not massive, showing that the arms race was not responsible for a massive increase in tension.

Perhaps the greatest increase in tensions at the time, caused by the arms

race, was the U2 spy plane incident, which led to a Paris meeting, between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, being cancelled. This incident was caused by the US attempting to see what Russia's nuclear capabilities truly were, using U2 spy planes to do so. However, when Russia managed to shoot one down it led to a bilateral increase in tensions. Firstly, the US were shocked that the Soviets could bring their plane down, but more importantly, Khrushchev was furious that the US were violating Soviet air space, after previously rejecting an 'Open Skies' proposal. Therefore, we can clearly see that the arms race led to some increases in US-Soviet tension, however, due to this event being rather a one-off, we cannot say the arms race directly led to a 'massive' increase in tensions.

To conclude, the ^{development of the} nuclear arms race did not ~~to~~ massively increase US-Soviet tensions as any increases in tension caused directly by the arms race (eg. CMC, U2 incident) were rare and sometimes had a resolution which lowered tension (i.e. the events of '63). In fact, most high points in tension were caused by other geopolitical issues, not directly the arms race. These ^{facts} ~~for~~ combined with how high tensions were in the fallout of the Berlin Blockade (1949) show beyond doubt that the development of the nuclear arms race did not massively increase US-Soviet tensions (1949-63).



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

This Level 3 response on the extent to which the nuclear arms race (1949-63) massively increased US-Soviet tensions is broadly analytical, and attempts to address the question. It also reaches an overall conclusion. However, the essay offers only modest range and depth which limits the development of the argument.

Question 4

Stronger responses assessed in depth why, and how significantly, US-Soviet relations improved in the 1970s. At this level, particular focus was placed on (1) the main reasons for détente such as improving Sino-US relations, desire to control the arms race, Soviet need for western technology, and the impact of Vietnam on America, and (2) how significantly US-Soviet relations improved by considering key developments such as SALT I and II, the Helsinki Accords, continued superpower competition in the Third World, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some high-scoring candidates explored 'how significantly' by analysing improvements and setting these against enduring US-Soviet differences and disagreements. Weaker responses tended to offer little development on the reasons for, and the extent of, improved US-Soviet relations in the 1970s. Typically, these were either weak narratives of the main events of détente or focused but largely unsupported responses on the causes of improved US-Soviet relations. A few low-scoring candidates confused developments under détente with those associated with peaceful coexistence.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 1 ☒

Question 2 ☒

Question 3 ☒

Question 4 ☒

PLAN

Trade, Culture, leader, geopolitical, Far East, relations with USSR.

Needs of USA, needs of USSR, needs of Europe, oil crisis, economic needs

There were many reasons as to why US achievements were better than USSR.

There were many reasons as to why US-Soviet relations improved in the 1970s. These include the needs of the USA, USSR, & Europe, and events like the oil crisis of 1973 which pushed both superpowers towards détente. It could be argued that the needs of the USSR were the most important cause because they were the most severe. There were many achievements of détente, for example SALT I and the Helsinki Accords. However there were many ~~more~~ events which showed that relations didn't actually improve, for example SALT II. Therefore it can be concluded that US-Soviet relations improved to an extent in the 1970s, however they didn't improve completely.

The USSR had many ~~more~~ reasons to push for détente with the USA in the 1970s. Nixon wanted to reduce the influence of

the military-industrial complex in America so that more money & resources were available to improve American lives. détente would allow this because it would mean that defence spending could be

(Section A continued) reduced. Nixon thought that more could be achieved through negotiation rather than confrontation and improved US-Soviet relations would provide an opportunity. ~~Not for~~ Therefore the needs of the USSR were important in improving relations.

It could be argued that the needs of the USSR were more important than the needs of the USA because the USSR were in a much weaker state economically. The rigid planning of their economic system meant that there was little flexibility and meant that it was easily disrupted by events like the oil crisis of 1973. The economy of the USSR was severely damaged by the amount of money they were giving to support communist regimes around the world. Around 3/4 of all hard currency in the USSR was given to support other communist regimes. For example \$11 billion was given to North Vietnam each year and \$4 billion was given to Cuba each year. Détente between the US & USSR would mean that the USSR could decrease the aid given to other communist regimes & could decrease the amount of defence spending as a whole, meaning more money would be available for things like consumer goods.

The needs of Europe were also important, but definitely not as important as the needs of the USSR. A West German politician, Willy Brandt, saw improved relations between East & West Europe as beneficial to the continent as a whole. ~~It therefore~~ This led to him creating 'Ostpolitik' which opened channels across the Iron Curtain & encouraged ~~the~~ things like trade. This encouraged détente

(Section A continued) because one of the ~~for~~ reasons for tension between the ~~countries~~ of two superpowers was the situation in Europe, and with that improving it meant that there could be more negotiations between the superpowers. However the needs of ~~both~~ Europe were not as important as the needs of the USSR because improved relations were happening between East & West Europe anyway, without the help of the USA & the USSR, meaning Détente wasn't as necessary to Europe as it was to the USSR.

Another factor that ~~had~~ encouraged Détente was the oil crisis of 1973. Egypt & Syria invaded Israel, and in order to put pressure on countries who supported Israel, like the UK & USA, Egypt increased oil prices by 70%. This caused economic ~~recession~~ decline & recession in the USA and pushed the US towards Détente because a decrease in military spending was now necessary in order to improve the economy. However this wasn't as important as the needs of the USSR because the US held the Washington energy conference which reduced the waste of the oil, meaning it wasn't a ~~mainly~~ important factor.

From this we can conclude that even though all of the factors in causing Détente were important, the needs of the USSR were a lot more important because they were the most severe and for the USSR Détente was absolutely necessary in order to avoid an economic collapse.

There were many achievements of Détente which showed

(Section A continued) that relations did improve to an extent in the 1970s. For example the SALT I treaty was successful in establishing arms limitations and improving relations between the two superpowers. SALT I involved 3 treaties, the ABM treaty, the interim treaty, and the Basic principles treaty, and each of these were successful in improving relations and decreasing the risk of nuclear war. For example the interim treaty involved reducing the number of ICBMs & SLBMs to 1,618 and 740 for the USSR and 1,054 & 740 for the USA, so effectively limiting arms. Another achievement of Détente was the Helsinki Accords. This was a conference of cooperation involving 33 states from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and they agreed on 3 'baskets' which stabilised the situation & improved relations between East & West. For example Basket 2 encouraged trade between East & West, which improved relations. However, Basket 3 involved an agreement to respect human rights that was signed by all countries. The USA thought this would undermine oppressive Soviet regimes in the USSR, therefore showing that relations only improved to an extent, not completely.

Détente had many achievements involving Europe. 'Ostpolitik' improved relations across the Iron Curtain and with a calm situation in Europe led to improved relations between the two superpowers. There were many treaties in Europe that occurred because of Détente, for example the Basic Treaty of 1972 involved East and West Germany formally recognising each other, which improved relations between East & West as a whole.

However, there were many examples & situations where it

(Section A continued) was clear that relations didn't improve completely. For example SALT II aimed for further arms reduction but ~~was never ratified~~ commitment was very low and it was never ratified, therefore showing that the two superpowers were not committed to détente enough for further arms limitation. & The presidencies of Carter & Ford were not very committed to détente. For example Carter's foreign policy was very confused, he had ^{two} ~~a~~ advisors, one wanted war while the other wanted peace with the USSR. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ~~started~~ in 1979 showed that relations didn't improve a lot and it was the last straw leading a détente. To the USA it showed that the USSR were still mainly concerned with aggressive expansion rather than cooperation, and because of the USA's improved economy they were prepared to increase arms again, meaning no more arms limitation. This therefore shows that relations only improved to an extent and ^{they} ~~they~~ were still tense between the two superpowers.

Overall we can see that détente in the 1970s was caused by many factors, for example the needs of USA & Europe, however the needs of the USSR were more important because they were most severe, and because of deteriorating relations with China and rapprochement, so it seemed necessary to improve relations with the USA. It is clear that there were many achievements of détente, of SALT I & Helsinki Accords, which ~~improve~~ were significant in improving relations. However relations didn't improve completely & there were still many tensions, for

(Section A continued) example with SALT II and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

**ResultsPlus****Examiner Comments**

This candidate has produced a high Level 4 answer by offering reasonably detailed knowledge within a focused analytical structure. The argument has been appropriately developed in terms of 'why' and 'how significantly' US-Soviet relations improved in the 1970s. Given the two elements of the question, this is a very sensible approach. Greater range and depth (for e.g. on SALT I and II) would have pushed this response into Level 5.

**ResultsPlus****Examiner Tip**

If you use the key phrases from the question throughout your essay, this will help you to write a relevant analytical response.

Question 5

Stronger responses were firmly focused on the role played by Anglo-French divisions in the failure of the League of Nations and the analysis was also linked to the other factors raised in the sources. At this level, candidates offered some balance in examining the debate and were likely to recognise the interaction of factors (e.g. the absence of the USA compounded the impact of Anglo-French disagreements in undermining the League). Relevant own knowledge was integrated and clearly tied to the debate contained within the sources. Low scoring candidates tended to produce (1) generalised responses regarding the failure of the League of Nations which lack focus on the role played by 'Anglo-French divisions', or (2) answers that simply describe the evidence of failure presented in the extracts, or fail to integrate material from the sources with own knowledge.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 5 ☒

Question 6 ☐

Question 7 ☐

Question 8 ☐

There are numerous arguments as to why the League failed. Source 1 takes the view that Anglo-French divisions paralysed the League and undermined their ability to protect smaller countries such as Abyssinia. Source 2 attributes the failure of the lack of USA presence, although it realises that it is uncertain as to whether the League would have ~~succeeded~~ succeeded had the USA been a member. Source 3 suggests that constitutional defects are the reason why the League failed.

Source 1 argues that French and British divisions undermined the League's ability to effectively deal with the Corfu incident. When this occurred, the League ordered Mussolini to remove his troops but he refused to do so. Eventually, the League ordered Greece to pay compensation to Italy and he finally retreated. This incident underlined the League's lack of power. ~~It was~~ ^{It was} not strong enough to resist aggressive leaders such as Mussolini. Still, it is questionable as to whether the Corfu incident failed because of French and British divisions ^{as Source 1 suggests} rather than lack

(Section B continued) of military sanctions ~~and not to~~ to give them strength. The view that there were ideological divisions between Britain and France is ~~is~~ supported in Source 3 (line 25-7). Britain and France viewed Hitler differently. Britain sympathized with his desire to strengthen Germany after the harsh Treaty of Versailles, whereas France saw him as a dangerous threat ~~also~~. They also disagreed on the ~~the~~ purpose of the League. Britain saw the League as a system of conciliation including Germany, whereas France saw it as a system of security against Germany. Ultimately, it was never going to be possible for the League to succeed if they could not even come to a compromise between their contrasting views on its purpose.

Source 2 challenges the view in Source 1, asserting that international peace would have been impossible without the USA. There is a nuance in the argument in Source two. The opening sentence implies that ~~that~~ Europe (post-war) had more problems ~~than~~ ^{than} USA membership would have been able to solve. Nevertheless, the prestige and strength that the USA would have brought with them would have proved invaluable - especially in the Manchurian Crisis (1931). The USA was the only power with resources that matched Japan's. They were Japan's main trading partner,

(Section B continued)

which means that if the USA had threatened a cessation of economic trading with Japan, the Manchurian Crisis could have been avoided. That being said, ~~it was not~~ during the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. army was not particularly strong, and so it is not definite that it would have militarily strengthened the League to a large extent. The last sentence of Source 2 suggests that USA non-membership would have possibly improved the chances of the League's survival, but it ~~does not~~ does not suggest that American participation was the reason why the League failed.

Source 3 implies that constitutional defects and the lack of an army were why the League failed to preserve peace - it 'lacked power'. The Assembly was required to unanimously make decisions, which took time and undermined the process. It asserts that the selfish interests of the powers, rather than Anglo-French divisions, was the reason why it failed. ~~The~~ The Monroe Doctrine prevented Congress from agreeing to participation, which is why Source 3 states it was 'disowned' by Washington. Above all, Britain was focused on imperialism and France wanted to take a pragmatic approach. Hugh Bogan stated that the League depended on the 'goodwill of the nations' to survive. Nevertheless, if the

(Section B continued) Powers were determined to ignore the League due to selfish interests, no solution could be given. This can be illustrated with the ~~Hoare-Laval~~ Hoare-Laval Pact that Britain and France made with Mussolini, secretly ceding Abyssinia to him after the crisis. In this case, it was Anglo-French co-operation and betrayal of the League, rather than their divisions, which hindered its success.

There are other factors that contributed to the failure of the League. It was seen as a 'victors club' for the successful powers after the war. This caused a divide among countries and increased the likelihood of failure. The League was based in Geneva, and because the Assembly took so long to make decisions, members of the Council who were primarily French or British had to step in. Additionally, the first Secretary ~~Robert~~ Sir Eric Drummond was British. These points all suggested to smaller countries that the League was focused on achieving European objectives. Seeing as they felt that their interests would be ignored, many of them left.

The association with Versailles was another reason why the League failed. Germany was not able to join until 1926, and they felt that it was extremely

(Section B continued) harsh and unfair. The League failed to capitalize on Germany's potential strength which could have been invaluable ~~for~~ - especially militarily. The League arguably turned Germany ~~as~~ into a pariah of the international community, and pushed them towards Russia (who were also banned from the League). They both felt that the League was a device to prevent the revision of the peace ~~the~~ settlements and eventually ~~the~~ Russia + Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo (1922). Its terms included economic co-operation, ~~as~~ a union against Poland and secret military agreements. Perhaps if Hitler wasn't so resentful over the lack of League membership, he would have been able to negotiate with the other powers and pacify his aggressive expansionist aims. ~~which~~

The divisions between France and Britain caused problems for the League. ~~that~~ Although it undermined its effectiveness, one would be hard pressed to say that it is the reason why the League failed. There are ~~undoubtedly~~ undoubtedly numerous reasons why the League failed - its association with Versailles, the view that it was a 'victors' club, constitutional defects and ^{lack of} American participation. ~~Attributing, one~~ It is perhaps historically naive to attribute the

(Section B continued) failure to one factor alone. However, one could assert that ~~the powers' divisions~~ the self-interest of the powers was responsible for failure to a further extent than divisions between Britain and France. Japan's militarism ~~had~~ conflicted with Britain's imperialism and Wilson's ~~desire~~ desire for idealism in Europe. The powers ultimately made decisions based on their own agendas and ignored the League in the process, thus sentencing it - albeit unintentionally - to failure.



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

Here, the candidate has produced a Level 3 answer by taking some information from the sources regarding the failure of the League of Nations and attempting to integrate a moderate amount of own knowledge to develop the argument. There is scope to offer more of both, and to cross-reference the sources in a more systematic way to strengthen the analysis.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

During the planning stage, after you have identified the key issues raised by the sources, add your own knowledge to these points. That way you'll find it easier to integrate the two elements in the actual essay.

Question 6

Stronger responses identified and developed arguments for and against the proposition from the sources, and considered to what extent US-Japanese conflict in 1941 was due to a fundamental clash of competing systems. At this level, candidates weighed the stated factor against US 'encouragement' and miscalculation, and Japan's bid to break the US economic stranglehold in the area, integrating relevant own knowledge and then reaching an explicit, supported judgement. Weaker responses were likely (1) to adopt a weak 'potted' summary approach to the sources or else include little or no own knowledge in support of their argument, or (2) to accept uncritically a familiar viewpoint (e.g. US miscalculation about Japan's intention and capability) and fail to consider properly the other arguments set out in the sources. A few narrative accounts of US-Japanese relations in the period up to 1941 figured at this level too.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 5 ☒

Question 6 ☒

Question 7 ☒

Question 8 ☒

The US-Japanese conflict ~~was~~ occurred for various reasons. The fundamental clash of competing systems was indeed one factor. However, other factors contributed to why there was a conflict between the USA and Japan. These included American miscalculation, the USA's non-military actions against Japan and Japan's thirst for expansion.

Firstly, Japan and the USA's ~~conflicting~~ ^{conflicted} ideologies ~~were conflicting~~ in their nature and ideals. This is supported by source 4 when it says that "Japan preferred a world divided into closed spheres of influence; the United States wanted a liberal capitalist world order, where all nations enjoyed freedom of trade and investment". ~~the~~ This is partially supported by source 6 when it says that Japan had ^{an} "aim of establishing a powerful economic empire (the so-called 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere')". Indeed, Japan had a long-term vision of expanding its empire in Asia, wanting to become the most powerful nation in Asia. It viewed China as the key to becoming this as China was rich in natural resources and had masses of territory, both of which Japan lacked. However, this policy of expanding into China was in itself directly opposed to American policy. The USA believed in an 'open-door' policy with China: that every nation have access to its wealth of riches and land. However, as source

4 mentions, Japan preferred the idea of "closed spheres of influence". Japan regarded Asia as Japan's rightful place to expand ^{into} ~~over~~, not the West's far-reaching hand of influence. It was this total clash of ideologies and competing systems which made war or conflict between the two increasingly likely. Not only

(Section B continued) were the two's ^{views of expansionism} ~~expansionist views~~ conflicting, but the political views of the USA and Japan were in complete contrast. As source 4 states, "the United States valued its democratic system; Japan embraced military-backed authoritarian regimes". Indeed, democracy was viewed as the only sustainable political policy to uphold ~~and~~ peace and freedom in the USA. Their ideals to lead all nations into a new world of peace and prosperity was based on democracy. However, Japan's expansionist ideals were rooted in its military background based on the idea of dictatorships leading Japan to conquering Asia. The conflicting nature of the two countries' ^{ideals} ~~ideals~~ were bound to end in conflict, as it did in 1941.

However, there were other factors which caused the US-Japanese conflict in 1941. One of these was American miscalculation ~~in~~ in underestimating Japan's ability and willingness to attack the USA. ~~The US~~ source 5 supports this when it says that it was "down to American ~~mis~~ miscalculation about Japan's intention and capability". This is partially supported in source 6 as it says that America "frozen Japan's assets". Indeed, the USA ultimately underestimated Japan's ability to be able to fight despite its trading embargo. Japan was well-known to be short on natural resources, as well as its ambition to expand to gain money and ~~land~~ land. The USA, aware of this, simply did not believe that Japan could or would attack the USA directly. The fact that Japan almost completely relied on the USA for trade, ~~showed that~~ in fact 70%

of Japan's imported goods came from ~~America~~ America, showed that Japan would surely be very dangerous in attacking the USA. The fact that they did took the USA by surprise, and made war very likely in 1941 when the ~~USA's~~ USA's attention was away from Japan in the Pacific.

Another reason why there was a US-Japanese conflict in 1941 was because of the USA's non-military ~~actions~~, or economic actions against Japan. This is supported in source 6 when it mentions that "it was the American embargo on Japanese trade and freezing of Japanese assets, which forced Japan to take action to prevent its economy from being strangled". This is partially supported in source 5 as it mentions that America had a "genuine conviction that Japan lacked the military means to launch attacks", and this was because of the economic sanctions the USA had imposed upon Japan. Because Japan was so heavily reliant on the USA for ~~econ~~ economic ~~strength~~ stability, America reasoned that Japan would not ~~risk~~ run the risk of losing its supplier of goods. However, Japan had spent decades on expanding its empire, including the Manchurian Crisis, where its troops were stationed and had easily occupied the natural resource-rich area. Japan could not face the humiliation of ^{withdrawing} ~~keeping~~ its troops from Manchuria and essentially undo its work of the past decades of expansionism. ^{Rather} ~~Instead~~, Japan took the opportunity to surprise the USA and land the first blow, namely the Pearl Harbour incident. Indeed, the USA's economic sanctions on Japan spurred Japan to attack the USA as it was too far gone in its expansionist programme to stop.

In conclusion, the most important factor for the cause of the US-Japanese conflict in 1941 was the USA's economic sanctions on Japan, as it proved to be the decisive factor in ~~forcing~~ ^{forcing} Japan to risk everything and attack the USA. Because of its proud expansionist ideals, Japan could not face undoing

its work and being humiliated by the USA in the process, so in effect the USA's actions forced a war between them and Japan. ~~but~~ In fact, in source 5, it (Section B continued) mentions how Roosevelt did not want a war, but he would have been aware of Japan's intentions to expand, aware of their proud nature and their unwillingness to backtrack from Manchuria. This, combining with the USA's economic sanctions on Japan, would have surely been a sign that ~~Jap~~ it would provoke Japan into a war, knowing that Japan would not stand down. Roosevelt wanted an excuse to join the war, and he got one when Pearl Harbor was attacked.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This Level 3 response on the reasons for the US-Japanese conflict in 1941 illustrates two common weaknesses in answers to the Controversy question. Although the candidate cross-references the sources, the links are often quite limited and only modest own knowledge is added to develop the argument. To strengthen the analysis, the extracts need to be more rigorously cross-referenced and more detailed relevant own knowledge integrated.

Question 7

High-scoring candidates demonstrated a firm grasp of the controversy and assessed the source arguments confidently using a support/challenge approach before reaching an explicit judgement. At this level, relevant own knowledge was convincing and firmly tied to addressing the debate within the sources (US expansionism, Soviet security needs/ expansionism, Truman's hardening attitudes, superpower misjudgements). Lower-scoring responses tended (1) to rely on a memorised 'perspectives' approach (covering the orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist interpretations of the onset of the Cold War) which was inadequately linked to the sources provided, or (2) to summarise the content of the sources with little or no integration of own knowledge. A few largely narrative accounts of US-Soviet relations in the years 1945-53 figured at this level too.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 5 ☒

Question 6 ☒

Question 7 ☒

Question 8 ☒

Both sources 7 and 9 support the view that US expansionism was primarily responsible for the development of the Cold War 1945-53, - with 7 to the greatest extent seeing how ~~then~~ the US was 'driven' the real expansionist force, driven by the ^{economic} need for markets', ~~however, this view is also~~ - in evidence when looking at the implementation of the Marshall Plan in the 5th June 1947. However, the importance of US expansionism is challenged in 8, where Leites argues that 'Ideology made the Soviet leaders see US policies as ~~other~~ expansionist and threatening', suggesting it was only because of the underlying ideological differences that suspicion and tension increased where it might not necessarily have done before. Ultimately though, both these factors are outweighed when considering the ^{the US misunderstanding the} importance of Soviet policies ~~and~~ and search of security through expansionism, emphasised by all the sources, - emphasised the most by 7 which notes how 'the USA misinterpreted... the USSR's moves for a defensive position'. Indeed, sources 8 and 9 focus on events in Iran in 1946 and later on how the Korean

(Section B continued) hot war in Korea by 1950.

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shared in Feb 1946 when he gave a speech at the Eugene
series, ~~repeating~~ ^{detailing} the inevitability of war. Thus, at

(Section B continued) the beginning of the ~~the~~ period at least, US expansionism was
not greatly influential in the development of the Cold War, as it
was the Soviet interpretation of ~~the~~ war policy - such as the
US defeat of Japan by September 1945 which caused
the tensions to rise unnecessarily, ~~as this ideology and fear~~
Indeed, ~~it should be argued that the importance of ideology~~ ^{The suggestion that US expansionism is the primary reason for the Cold War}
~~Another factor which the sources highlight as contributing~~ ^{begins to be ultimately}
~~the influence of US expansionism in developing the Cold War, for as~~ ^{by source}
~~which~~ ^{the US} ~~7 further notes, it was 'driven by an economic need for markets~~
~~by a liberal capitalist world war', - a reference to the suggestion~~
~~that any US expansionism that took place was due to~~
~~the need of the US to assert their ideology to dominate~~
~~the war, as the destruction of Europe had reduced the world~~
~~demand for US goods - a problem when the US~~ ^{controlled} ~~supplied~~ ^{90%}
~~of manufacturing in the world.~~

Another reason therefore for the development of the Cold War,
~~is therefore~~ ^{by} highlighted by the sources, is therefore ideological
differences. Both sources 7 and 8 suggest this view, with 8 in
particular taking a more orthodox stance, by explaining
the USSR's need 'for promoting world revolution'. This had been
a communist aim in the USSR since October 1917 - for Lenin
~~followers~~ had been a strong supporter of Karl Marx, ~~an~~ author
of 'The Manifesto of the Communist Party' in 1848 and advocate
of world revolution. Thus, ideology clearly was a deep rooted

cause of contention, increasing the extent to which it is

(Section B continued) important in ~~an~~ developing the Cold War. ~~Nevertheless~~

~~this view is partly challenged by~~ Indeed, it is ~~more~~ supported

by Source 9 where Hough's notes show, in practice, this led to

'fears' in the US of 'a complete Communist takeover'. ~~Hough's~~

~~focuses on the Korean War which, during the escalation from~~

This is reinforced by looking at the example of the Korean War,

where Stalin authorised ~~a~~ Communist North Korea, led by Kim

Il Sung, to invade the Capitalist south - leading to US fears of

'the domino theory'; that ~~due to Communist expansionism and~~

~~ideology~~, Korea became Communist, the rest of Asia would too.

~~Nevertheless the importance of this view is contested when considering~~

Source 9's emphasis on how 'US foreign forces in Korea were

strengthened', implying that it ~~was not US expansionism but~~

~~had to be a combination of both US expansionism~~ Indeed, the

importance of this ~~are~~ US expansionism is reinforced by 9

which notes that, ~~even~~ following Soviet ~~or~~ presence due to

ideology, in Korea, 'US forces were strengthened', overall

proving that ^{aggressive} ~~only~~ US expansionism, at least towards the

end of the time period when the chances of hot war were

greater due to ~~the~~ established ideological divisions, were

in fact merely to contain Communism, not ~~to influence~~ ^{for expansionist} reasons.

~~democracy~~ * ~~For~~ This ^{proven by} ~~is a~~ Source 9 that historian Chris

Edwards ^{who sums up} ~~states~~ that 'US policy ~~was more anti-~~

~~democracy than was~~ in the 1940's was more anti-Communist

~~than pro-democracy~~. Nevertheless, although this ~~shows~~

that ~~ideology~~ 'The main aim of the Truman Doctrine

(Section B continued) and Marshall Plan were to help contain ~~Communist~~ ~~expansion~~ ~~communist~~ 'The communist expansionism'. This therefore begins to suggest that, Soviet expansionism, or rather, the US interpretation of ~~the~~ Soviet policies were the main reason for the development of the Cold War, as, ~~it~~ although ~~the~~ ~~both~~ ~~US~~ ~~expansion~~ possible US ~~expansion~~ expansionism and differing ideologies provided a basis for tension to develop, it was the superpowers interpretations of this which provoked any aggressive response and escalation in tension - a factor suggested in all 3 sources.

Ultimately, it can be proved that it was the ^{US'} ~~superpowers~~ misinterpretation of ~~the~~ ~~and~~ Soviet policies and ~~and~~ which was primarily the reason for the development of the Cold War, as this lead to any underlying tension to ~~be~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~escalate~~ into aggression. Source 7 ~~also~~ ~~here~~ suggests this, noting how 'Soviet expansionism sought only to secure the USSR a limited defensive position'. This is a ^{Post-Revisionist} source that ~~more~~ ¹ ~~TL~~ ~~Graddis~~ takes, arguing that the need for a Soviet sphere of influence was as a defensive zone to avoid future invasion, due to Soviet ~~insecurity~~ following WW2. Indeed, 8 reinforces this, noting how Stalin was not 'basically cautious' - a point proved when looking at Stalin's ~~response~~ in holding back firing in the Berlin Airlift which occurred after 30th June 1948 for 324 days, or, as ⁹ ~~it~~ ~~points~~ ~~out~~, ~~the~~ ~~event~~ ~~is~~ in reference to the Iran Crisis, his eventual withdrawal of 30,000 troops from Iran following

(Section B continued) *opposition in the UN, then show that Stalin's policies
~~were~~ were perhaps not as provocative as it seems, and were
only misunderstood by the US. ~~He did not~~ ~~address~~
p*



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

This Level 4 response integrates source material and the candidate's own knowledge to good effect. The key arguments in the sources are identified, examined, cross-referenced and extended with relevant own knowledge to develop the argument. The conclusion also makes a clear and reasoned judgement about which factor was primarily responsible for the onset of the Cold War.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

When planning your answer, read through the sources carefully and list all the support and challenge points you can. This will help you to cross reference effectively in your essay.

Question 8

Stronger responses demonstrated a good understanding of the controversy and assessed the source arguments (moral bankruptcy of communism in the Soviet bloc, Reagan's policies towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s, Soviet economic and technological inferiority, and Gorbachev's 'New Thinking') confidently using a support/challenge approach before reaching an explicit, supported judgement. At this level, relevant own knowledge was convincing and firmly tied to addressing the debate within the sources. Weaker responses tended to produce (1) a memorised 'end of Cold War' essay (sketchily surveying the triumphalist, ideationist etc. perspectives) which was inadequately linked to the sources provided (2) a basic 'potted' source by source commentary with little or no cross-referencing which prevented the development of a support/challenge approach, or (3) a generalised narrative account of the end of the Cold War.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 5 ☒

Question 6 ☒

Question 7 ☒

Question 8 ☒

~~① moral bankruptcy of communism.~~
~~⑩ "illegitimate" → citizens~~
~~⑪ "confidence in the ultimate collapse of communism" → aided by Reagan's~~
~~⑫ "democratised population"~~
~~"legitimacy of the com"~~
~~⑩~~
~~⑬ Reagan~~
~~↳ ③ less hardline stance → passive~~
~~⑭ hardline~~
~~↳ counteracted military revolution, S.P.I.~~
~~⑮ recognises Gorb.~~
~~"humanising effect"~~
~~↳ refusal to give up S.P.I. at 1986 Congress~~
~~↳ Gorbys persistence.~~
~~⑯ Hungary Poland~~
~~⑰ Economy~~
~~"declining economic performance"~~
~~"widening tech gap"~~
~~1967~~
~~1980 5.25% → 2%~~
~~30 million 50,000 PCs.~~
~~↳ Gorbys needed.~~
~~⑱ Gorbachev → sources display~~
~~⑲ "democratisation and econ"~~
~~↳ Brezhnev Doctrine (1958)~~
~~↳ 1/2 mill's~~
~~glasnost, perestroika~~
~~⑳ "Reagan encouraged"~~
~~INF Treaty~~
~~↓~~
~~Czech Velvet + Solidarity~~
~~1985-1~~

(Section B continued) policy of "democratisation", as manifested in his rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine in his speech at the UN in December 1988, the ~~pop~~ ~~the~~ people's dissatisfaction with the moral bankruptcy of communism would have had little effect. It was only after ~~December 1988~~ ^{Gorbachev's rejection} of the Brezhnev Doctrine that events such as the introduction of multi-party elections in Hungary were allowed to happen, which is also underemphasised in Source 11's claim that Reagan ~~was~~ believed in "the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union", suggesting that ~~the~~ ^{its} "illegitimate" nature (Source 10) would bring about ~~the~~ the downfall of the USSR regardless of Gorbachev's actions. In this sense, ~~this is only~~ ^{Source} 12 provided the most balanced view concerning the effects of the "eroded ~~the~~ legitimacy" of the communist system, as it recognises much more than Sources 10 and 11 that it took a Soviet leader like Gorbachev to ~~enable~~ ~~the~~ recognise the ~~moral bankruptcy~~ dissatisfaction caused by the moral bankruptcy of communism and respond to it with "reform" (Source 12).

Source 11 promotes the idea that it was Reagan's less "hardliner posture" in the second ^{term} ~~half~~ of his presidency from 1985 that brought about the end of the Cold War. In claiming that "he talked to Gorbachev", Source 11 suggests that it was Reagan who played a more active role in bringing about "negotiation" ~~at~~ between the superpowers and that Gorbachev was a passive recipient of ~~Reagan's~~ ^{Reagan's} policies; ~~this is~~ ^{rather than Reagan,} in contrast, Source 12 ~~claims that~~ recognises that it was Gorbachev, who ~~he~~ was the leader ~~to~~

(Section B continued) responsible for "forging a less competitive relationship" between the superpowers. Indeed, ~~it was only~~ there is scope to challenge Source 11's ~~to~~ argument that it was Reagan who had a "humanising effect" upon superpower relations through "personal negotiation", as he ~~was not~~ refused to let go of his SDI initiative at the 1985 Geneva Summit and the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, suggesting that he was ~~more~~ less willing than Gorbachev, who suggested the elimination of all nuclear arsenal by 2000 - to foster ^{friendlier} relationship with the USSR. Furthermore, Source 11 downplays the role of Reagan's more ^{towards the USSR} "hard-line posture" during the first term of his presidency from January 1981, whereas Source 10 ~~does not~~ ^{more} focuses on his harder stance towards the Soviet Union, epitomised by his denunciation of the USSR as the "focus of evil in the modern world" in his speech in March 1983. ~~However, whilst his 'Evil Empire' speech may have~~ At Source 12 claims, his 'Evil Empire' speech may have further convinced the citizens of the Soviet Bloc of the ^{nature} "illegitimate" ~~of~~ of communism, giving rise to later popular protests such as the Velvet Revolution in December 1988 in Czechoslovakia. ~~Like Source 12~~ Like Source 10, Source 12 ~~emphasises~~ places more emphasis upon the effect of Reagan's hard-line stance, ~~and~~ of providing "a widening technological gap with the West" as one of the factors pressurising Gorbachev into a "reform"; the "technological gap" most likely derived from Reagan's introduction of his 'militarised counter-revolution' - which involved a 53% increase in the US defence budget in October 1983.

(Section B continued) and the renewed development of the B1 Bomber and the neutron bomb - and his SDI initiative, which the USSR would not have been technologically able to compete with. Nevertheless, whilst Source 11 places too much emphasis of Reagan's accordingly stance, rather than that of ~~Reagan~~ Gorbachev, it is more accurate that Sources 10 and 12 in placing less emphasis on the role of his hardline stance, as it failed to ~~draw out~~ draw out concessions from Andropov or Chernenko.

Source 12 attributes the end of the Cold War to the USSR's ~~the mounting economic performance~~ problems. ~~the USSR's~~ It's "declining economic performance", as evidenced by the fact that the ^{growth rate of the} USSR's ~~annual industrial~~ annual industrial output had declined from ~~5.25%~~ 5.25% in 1967 to a mere 2% in 1980; and its "widening technology gap with the West" ~~shown~~ by the fact that the ~~Soviet Bloc had~~ USA had 30 million PCs compared to the USSR's ~~50,000 of an~~ 50,000 of an inferior model in the 1980s), meant that ^{the USSR} it could no longer compete with the West in the arms race and that ~~it~~ ~~the~~ ~~its citizens~~ ~~also~~ it "eroded the legitimacy of the communist system," ~~as~~ as is supported by Source 10's claim ~~that~~ concerning the Eastern Europeans' belief in the "illegitimate" nature of the USSR. However, Source 12 places too much emphasis on the USSR's "declining economic performance" as being a factor pressuring Gorbachev into reform. However, whilst Source 12 explains economic problems as

(Section B continued) a factor pressurising Gorbachev into "reforms". Source 10 concentrates more on the impact it had upon the people themselves. Nevertheless, Source 12 places too much emphasis on the USSR's "declining economic performance" as pressurising Gorbachev; whilst economic problems and an "inability of the Soviet Union's economy to compete with the West" had plagued the USSR since the time of Stalin's leadership, it took a leader like Gorbachev to recognise the need to implement change.

Nevertheless, Source 12 recognises much more than Sources 10 and 12 ~~the significance of~~ ^{the} ~~that~~ ^{the} ~~ending of the~~ Cold War was ^{mainly} brought about by Gorbachev. Whilst Source 12 ~~also~~ suggests that it was Gorbachev who took the initiative for change — he "believed that continued coercive control of Eastern Europe was incompatible with democratisation and economic reform in the Soviet Union" — Source 11 suggests that it was Reagan who brought about cooperation through "negotiation". However, it was Gorbachev's introduction of his New Political Thinking in 1985, including glasnost openness and Perestroika, that de-ideologised the USSR's stance, making cooperation with the ~~USSR~~ USA possible. Whilst Reagan can perhaps be credited for resisting his "aides (who) urged a more aggressive stance", it took a change in the Soviet leadership to ~~make friendship~~ make the ~~1987~~ 1987 ~~Washington~~ INF Treaty ~~possible~~ at the Washington Summit.

to achieve ~~any~~ agreements.
(Section B continued) possible; as it was Gorbachev's persistence, despite Reagan's refusal to make concessions on his SDI and arms limitations at the previous Geneva Summit (1985) and the Reykjavik Summit (1986) that made this possible. Furthermore, whilst Source 11 credits "the astonishing scenes of jubilation in eastern Europe in 1989" to Reagan, it was due to Gorbachev's rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine and his withdrawal of 1/2 million troops from Eastern Europe in 1988 that the Velvet Revolution of ~~the~~ December 1989 and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was met with no resistance from the USSR, thus making the fall of the Iron Curtain possible.

Altogether, whilst the three sources downplay his role, it was Gorbachev who ~~played the~~ was the most important in ending the Cold War. ~~Whilst~~ Source 10 ~~pro~~ claims that the "illegitimate" nature of the USSR caused its downfall, ignoring Gorbachev's willingness to effect change. Source 11 credits Reagan's moderate stance for too much, failing to recognise that it was Gorbachev who introduced his New Political Thinking and thus making "negotiation" fruitful and "jubilation in Eastern Europe" possible. Source 11 perhaps recognises the most Gorbachev's initiative in ending the Cold War; however, it emphasises too much the economic pressures that propelled Gorbachev to do so. Whilst issues of ~~economy~~ "dealings

(Section B continued) economic performance" (Source 12) ~~or~~ and the moral bankruptcy of communism, suggested in Source 10 as seen by protests in Poland by Solidarity in 1980-1 or the 1968 Prague Spring, had always plagued the USSR, it took the rise of Gorbachev in March 1985 and the decline of an inflexible gerantocracy to end the Cold War.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

This Level 5 response to Question 8 possesses several obvious strengths. The candidate uses the source material provided, together with relevant detailed own knowledge, to assess the relative importance of a range of factors (including the moral bankruptcy of communism, Reagan's policies, Soviet economic problems, and the role played by Gorbachev). The analysis is also based on confident source cross-referencing and integration of own knowledge. Finally, a clear and reasoned judgement is made in the conclusion.

Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

In Depth Study Question

- Candidates must provide more factual details. Candidates need to ensure their subject knowledge conforms to the specification. Weaker responses usually lacked range and/or depth of analysis.
- Stay within the specific boundaries of the question – for example, some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods.
- More candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively.
- In order to address the question more effectively, candidates need to offer an analysis not provide a descriptive or chronological account. Many candidates produced answers, which were focused and developed appropriately.
- Some candidates need to analyse key phrases and concepts more carefully.
- Some candidates could have explored links and the interaction between issues more effectively.
- Regarding conclusions they were sometimes basic summaries rather than offering an explicit judgment linked to the analytical demands of the question. The importance of conclusions that are explicit rather than implicit is emphasised. Indeed, it was fairly rare to find an answer for Section A especially that was not of Level 4 quality overall where there were effective, considered introductions and conclusions.
- Some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods, especially for Question 4.

Associated Historical Controversy Question

- It is suggested that the students who perform best on Section B tended to be those who read the sources carefully, accurately and critically; recognised themes and issues arising from the sources, then used these to address the question. Some candidates potentially limited themselves by closing off potential areas of enquiry by seeking to make the evidence of the sources fit the contention in the question, without full thought to the issues within the sources, or by using the sources to illustrate arguments without relating evidence to other sources or own knowledge.
- Candidates need to treat the sources as a package to facilitate cross-referencing and advance a convincing line of argument. Many weaker candidates resorted to 'potted' summaries of each source which failed to develop a support/challenge approach.
- Candidates need to integrate the source material and their own knowledge more effectively to substantiate a particular view. Some candidates could have explored links and interaction more effectively between own knowledge and the sources. Weaker responses were frequently too reliant on the sources provided and little or no own knowledge was included.
- Some needed to develop their points with more specific factual details.
- More candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively.
- Some candidates could have explored links / interaction more effectively between own knowledge and the sources. Some needed to develop their points with more specific factual details.

- Candidates should avoid memorised 'perspectives' essays and base their responses on the issues raised by the sources instead. The Associated Historical Controversy question is an exercise in interpretation not historiography. Whilst there was some excellent analysis which incorporated historiographical knowledge, reference to, say, 'revisionist' historians often added little, or was even to the detriment of genuine analysis.
- That said, there were very few really weak responses. The impression was that the substance of the source at least enabled candidates offer some development and supporting evidence. In such cases though, candidates often struggled to extend issues with own knowledge, or really analyse the given views.
- There was also a correlation between those candidates who reviewed all sources in their opening paragraph and high performance. Whilst a telling introduction is not essential, the process of carefully studying the sources to ascertain how they relate to the statement in the question, prior to writing the main analysis, allows candidates to clarify and structure their arguments.

Grade Boundaries

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

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