Write your name here Surname	Other na	mes
Pearson Edexcel GCE	Centre Number	Candidate Number
History Advanced Unit 3 Option D: The Cha	illenge of Fascism	1
Friday 10 June 2016 – Mo Time: 2 hours	orning	Paper Reference 6HI03/F (D1) 6HI03/D (D2)
You must have: Sources Insert (enclosed)		Total Marks

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
 - there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets
 - use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses
 - you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.
- This paper has two unit codes. Unit 3 6HI03/F Topic D1 From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45 is a prohibited combination with Unit 1 6HI01/F.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

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SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3. Section B begins on page 11.

D1 - From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900-45

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 How far do you agree with the view that, in the years 1900–14, Germany made significant steps towards becoming a democracy?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 To what extent was there significant opposition to the Nazi regime in the years 1939–45?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

D2 - Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 To what extent did the Battle of Britain contribute towards the Allies' ultimate victory against Germany?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 How far do you agree with the view that high morale was the most important factor in maintaining the war effort on the home front during the years 1939–45?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS



SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box \boxtimes . If you change you
mind, put a line through the box $oxtimes$ and then indicate your new question with a cross $oxtimes$.

Chosen question number:	Question 1	\boxtimes	Question 2	\boxtimes
	Question 3	\boxtimes	Question 4	\boxtimes



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SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert. Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the First World War arose primarily as a result of German aggression?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the Nazis created a regime based on consent?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)



D2 - Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert. Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that Chamberlain's policy of appearement was shameful and mistaken?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree that the war significantly shifted expectations over post-war reform?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS



SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box \boxtimes . If you change your
mind, put a line through the box $oxtimes$ and then indicate your new question with a cross $oxtimes$.

Chosen question number:	Question 5	\boxtimes	Question 6	\boxtimes
	Question 7	X	Question 8	\boxtimes



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	TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS	



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Pearson Edexcel GCE

History

Advanced Unit 3

Option D: The Challenge of Fascism

Friday 10 June 2016 - Morning

Sources Insert - Section B

Paper Reference

6HI03/F (D1) 6HI03/D (D2)

Do not return the insert with the question paper.

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D1 - From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900-45

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1

(From Jeremy Paxman, Great Britain's Great War, published 2013)

Germany had been waiting for an opportunity. It also had a plan, long in preparation. Now it required ruthless execution. The country had the great geographical advantage of sitting at the heart of Europe, and had been preparing for war for years: railway lines, for example, had been laid to the borders of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland, where they terminated in stations for which there was no conceivable commercial need. German war ambitions were personified in 'The All Highest War Lord', the Kaiser, with his dressing-up box full of military uniforms and a passion for a German empire to justify them.

SOURCE 2

(From Gordon Martel, *The Origins of the First World War*, published 1987)

Politically, German leaders concluded that they had been 'encircled' by Russia, France and Great Britain, and that successive diplomatic crises had demonstrated that it was impossible to break out of this combination by peaceful means. The German landowners and bourgeoisie were also generally inclined to believe that a great victorious war would enable them to triumph over those elements in German society, particularly the socialists of the industrial cities, opposed to the rule of the traditional elite. The most significant of the underlying causes of the war was the dynamic growth of German power in the decades that preceded it, and the fact that the management of that power resided with an elite who were accustomed to believe that war was an attractive policy that usually brought them social, political and economic rewards.

SOURCE 3

(From Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, published 2013)

The quest for blame predisposes the investigator to construe the actions of decisionmakers as planned and driven by a coherent intention. It is not logically impossible that war came about in this manner, but such arguments are not supported by the evidence. There is no smoking gun in the story of the outbreak of war in 1914, or, rather, there is one in the hands of every major character.

Viewed in this light, the outbreak of war was a tragedy, not a crime.

Acknowledging this does not mean that we should minimise the belligerence and imperialist paranoia of the Austrian and German policy-makers that rightly absorbed the attention of Fritz Fischer and his historiographical allies. But the Germans were not the only imperialists and not the only ones to succumb to paranoia. The crisis that brought war in 1914 was the fruit of a shared political culture. But it was also multipolar* and genuinely interactive.

^{*}Multipolar = involving several centres of power

D1 - From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900-45

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4

(From Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler*, published 2001)

Hitler aimed for an authoritarian and leader-oriented system, but one that had popular backing, and his regime was deeply concerned, even paranoid, about popular opinion and citizens' reactions to official measures of all kinds. Germans were not expected merely to adjust and accommodate themselves to the new system, but to become 'idealistically' motivated, to reflect back to the Nazis that what the Third Reich stood for was in the 'best' of German traditions, to get involved in displays of affection for Hitler and his vision of 'community', and in practical terms, to help bring about the new order by actively cooperating with the police and the Party. In their successful cultivation of popular opinion, the Nazis did not need to use widespread terror against the population to establish the regime. Many Germans went along, not because they were mindless robots, but because they convinced themselves of Hitler's advantages and of the 'positive' sides of the new dictatorship.

SOURCE 5

(From Stephen J. Lee, Aspects of European History 1789–1980, published 1982)

The SS and Gestapo, effectively united in 1934, provided a secure base for the regime, while new legal powers emerged as a result of drastic changes in the concept of justice and the role of the courts. The traditional notion of the law circumscribing the power of the government and the ruling parties was replaced by the principles of 'National Socialist philosophy, especially as expressed by the utterances of our Führer' (Hans Frank). There was now no impediment to the use of coercion and terror, with the total destruction of the Weimar Constitution that had proclaimed 'All Germans are equal before the law.' and 'All inhabitants of the Reich enjoy full religious freedom of conscience.' Such safeguards were shredded by the Nuremberg Laws (1935) and by the extensive use of the SS and Gestapo system of concentration camps.

SOURCE 6

(From Shelley Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich*, published 2004)

Nazism's successes encouraged the majority of Germans, whom the regime's terror did not directly affect, to appreciate the Third Reich's 'socialism of deed'. Building on the regime's notion of the racial community, the inclusiveness of which depended on the identification, exclusion, and elimination of outcasts, the KdF's* tourism and leisure-time activities reinforced the segregation between the regime's victims and racially and politically acceptable Germans. To be sure, the KdF was as intrusive as the regime that sponsored it, but the German tourists' desire to have fun while resisting the KdF's attempts to discipline them, suggests that the regime's partial capitulation to less easily politicised popular desires contributed to its legitimacy.

*KdF = *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength Through Joy)

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D2 - Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7

(From Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory*, published 2004)

The name Munich has become synonymous with a pejorative sense of appeasement, and with some reason. The terms were no better than before; but Chamberlain, having undermined any French will to resist, now closed on the deal and presented the bill to the Czechs. At Munich the fine arguments for appeasement as a process of mutual concession involved Chamberlain in making the necessary sacrifices, not on his own behalf, and not at his own expense, but that of the Czechs. Chamberlain took what comfort he could from the written undertaking, promising that Hitler would now mend his ways. So Chamberlain quelled his own doubts. What snapped the credibility of appeasement was Hitler's conduct after Munich. In March 1939 he made a nonsense of all his promises to respect the new Czech frontiers.

SOURCE 8

(From an article by Ian Kershaw *The twisted road to war*, published 2008)

Chamberlain's military chiefs advised against going to war. The Dominions did not want to fight over Czechoslovakia. Despite their large army, the French, too, had no appetite for a fight. The League of Nations was by this time scarcely even a paper tiger, and across the Atlantic, the militarily weak US was only just starting to show concern about developments in Europe. All in all, Chamberlain was dealt a terribly bad hand, which, however, he then proceeded to play badly through his mistaken assessment of Hitler's aims and his over-eagerness to placate the dictator with territorial concessions.

SOURCE 9

(From Stephen J. Lee, Aspects of British Political History, published 1996)

It was vitally important that Britain's defences should not be put to the test prematurely. As early as 1936 Chamberlain had written, 'if only we can keep out of war for a few years, we shall have an Air Force of such striking power that no one will care to run risks with it.' For Chamberlain, therefore, the crisis over Czechoslovakia came at the worst possible time. He felt impelled to follow his instinct that 1938 was too early to risk war. He was supported by the Committee for Imperial Defence, which argued that 'if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in 6–12 months' time'. Additionally, Chamberlain judged that the people of Britain and the Empire were simply not ready for war – and certainly not on the issues prevalent in 1938.

D2 - Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10

(From Arthur Marwick et al, War and Change in Twentieth Century Europe, published 1990)

In a league table of countries which benefitted most from social legislation during and after the war, Britain would head the list. A spate of social legislation towards the end of the war and during the period of the post-war Labour government affected all sections of British society. The 1944 Education Act, the 1945 Family Allowance Act, the 1946 Acts involving National Insurance, Industrial Injuries and the National Health Service, and the National Assistance Act of 1948, all played their part in establishing what came to be known as the British welfare state. This legislation was based on, and influenced by, the Beveridge Report, with its comprehensive policy of social progress: a document produced during the early years of the war which must form a vital link in any chain joining the war experience to the enactment of social legislation.

SOURCE 11

(From A. N. Wilson, *Our Time: The Age of Elizabeth II*, published 2008)

The people of Britain had voted in as their Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who had a very clearly explained programme. Attlee and his team wanted the socialist government which had begun in wartime to continue in peacetime.

After five years of it, however, the electorate made it plain that its wishes were far less clear-cut. Many people felt that the last thing they wished was to have their life savings and their income confiscated by the state, the more so, since there was not much evidence that the railways, as British Railways, ran any better than they did before. As the years went by, the nationalised coal and steel industries performed noticeably less well than their continental rivals. Whilst the National Health Service was deemed to be a success, it seemed less and less affordable.

SOURCE 12

(From Rex Pope, War and Society 1899–1948, published 1991)

Those demanding expensive programmes in health or social security argued that if the country could organise its economic affairs to fight a war on this scale successfully, then it could surely organise its resources to achieve peacetime welfare objectives. There were counter-influences, such as Churchill's concern not to promise what might not be practicable, or the fear of the reaction of Britain's American bankers to over-ambitious welfare schemes. Overall though, the Second World War does appear to have been accompanied by a change in social policy. The opposition to comprehensive and universal policies in education, health and income-maintenance had been defeated. While many of the high hopes of the immediate post-war years were later frustrated, governments in the 1940s and 1950s did not disengage themselves from their social commitments.

